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This study focuses on the role of Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation and economic empowerment 
policy in community development. In particular, it investigates the contribution of 
community ownership of mineral resource wealth to community development with particular 
reference to the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust (ZCSOT) in Zvishavane 
District, Zimbabwe. The study is situated within the framework of participatory community 
development and seeks to explore whether the ZCSOT stimulate broad-based participation at 
community level in the ownership and utilisation of natural resource wealth as envisioned in 
the indigenisation policy. The research utilised methodological triangulation, using a 
questionnaire and in-depth interviews for data collection. The findings of this study suggest 
that the community ownership of mineral resource wealth through community share 
ownership trusts (CSOTs) is capable of bringing positive social and economic transformation 
in resource-rich communities much better than state-centred and/or corporate-led 
development. However, the study also highlights that because of certain irregularities in the 
indigenisation policy and the subsequent operational imperfections evident in the operation of 
the ZCSOT, community engagement in the process of development is quite marginal. 
Instead, what we see is political manipulation of the CSOT, lack of transparency and 
corruption due to the non-representation of ordinary community members in the CSOT, thus 
impeding their full participation. The involvement of traditional leaders in CSOTs has 
promoted the entrenchment of relations of domination, paternalism and stifling of democracy, 
thereby contradicting with the principles of participatory community development. In the 
end, the study establishes that the success of community ownership of mineral resource 
wealth in the socio-economic transformation of mineral-rich communities needs need to be 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction  
This chapter presents the aims and objectives of the study as well as the research questions 
that this study seeks to answer. In addition, it gives a historical background and the policy 
context within which Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation policy was formulated. The historical 
evolution of economic policy in Zimbabwe shows that the country inherited a highly 
regulated macro-economic policy from the colonial regime which spanned until the late 
1980s. The 1990s then witnessed a policy shift towards a market-based economy but this was 
later abandoned in the early 2000s when the country adopted a more repressed and state 
controlled economic policy which culminated in resource redistribution in the form of land 
reform. 
Research aims and research question 
The aim of this study was to investigate the contribution of community ownership of mineral 
wealth, through community share ownership trusts (CSOTs), to community development. 
Community development is conceptualised by Jeppe (1985) as a process of transforming the 
social and economic conditions of living for the whole community with the participation and 
on the initiative of the whole community. Basically, the study sought to explore the ways in 
which different groups of people in Zvishavane‘s rural communities participate in and benefit 
from the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust (ZCSOT). Since citizenship 
participation is the bedrock of community development, the study sought to explore how 
ordinary community members participate in the process of local community development. 
Participation is seen as the ultimate answer to the problem of sustainable community 
development, but the critical question to ask is: Who participates, to which level and who 
benefits? 
The main question for this study was: Does community ownership of mineral-resource wealth 
contribute to community development? In an endeavour to promote equitable sharing of 
benefits from natural resource exploitation in resource-rich communities, the indigenisation 
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policy calls for community ownership of mineral resources through community share 
ownership trusts. Other attendant questions for this study were: What are the social and 
economic conditions of living prevalent in resource-rich rural communities? How do CSOTs 
engender broad-based community participation in the ownership and utilisation of mineral 
wealth for community development? How do different social categories of people in 
resource-rich communities benefit from the community development initiatives pursued 
through CSOTs?  
Zimbabwe’s economic policy trajectory since 1980 
An analysis of Zimbabwe‘s macro-economic policy trajectory shows an interplay between 
socio-political environment and policy decisions and this is evident in the economic policies 
crafted and adopted since the country‘s independence in 1980 (Gwenhamo, 2009; Zhou and 
Zvoushe, 2012). During the 1980s, the independence euphoria together with the joy of taking 
control of state institutions provided much of the background to the conception and 
implementation of economic policy. During this period, macro-economic policy was 
conceived within the growth with equity policy framework as government tried to promote 
equitable distribution of wealth between the rural and urban economies (Zhou and Zvoushe, 
2012).  
At independence, Zimbabwe inherited a structurally differentiated and polarised economy 
characterised by a relatively well-developed urban sector and a predominantly impoverished 
rural economy that, ironically, provided livelihood to about 70 to 80 per cent of the country‘s 
population (NIEEB, 2013). In order to reduce the widening socio-economic disparities 
between these two economies, the government adopted a highly controlled economic policy 
framework characterised by high spending committed towards redressing the socio-economic 
inequalities. The state was more of a ―distributive and welfarist state‖ (Zhou and 
Masunungure, 2006:16) following socialist principles in the allocation and distribution of 
resources and social benefits. Most prominent was government‘s commitment towards 
3 
 
resolving the racial imbalances in access to land and provision of free health and education in 
the rural areas.  
However, sustaining such an expansionary welfarist economy that primarily focused on 
wealth distribution rather than wealth creation proved to be a major challenge due to 
economic stagnation in the first decade of independence (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). As such, 
economic policy restructuring was made inevitable by the failure of welfarist policies. Policy 
making in the second decade after independence can be analysed within the broad framework 
of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) that were adopted across Africa 
and the world over in the 1990s as prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank. Structural adjustment programmes were neo-liberal market-driven policy 
measures that sought to reverse the expansionary policies of the previous decade. The 
neoliberal thinking emphasised minimal state intervention in the economy, protection of 
private property and promoting market-driven development mainly through private and 
foreign investors (Stiglitz, 2002; Bond and Manyanya, 2003). In Zimbabwe, the ESAP policy 
document of 1990 emphasized on reducing government expenditure on social services and 
promoting economic growth through deregulating the domestic market and other institutional 
reforms of liberalisation (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). This translated to mean that social and 
economic development in resource-endowed communities assumed a market-based approach, 
and this was mainly pursued under the banner of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by 
private businesses (Sirolli, 2008).   
By the late 1990s, it was becoming evident that the policies promoted by Washington and the 
IMF were failing to propel Zimbabwe‘s macro-economy into prosperity, rather, it ―helped to 
deepen the recession that continued to grip Zimbabwe‖ (Gwenhamo, 2009:3). Zhou and 
Zvoushe (2012:220) note that the socio-economic challenges experienced during the period 
of economic liberalisation were ―a harbinger of the record-breaking economic meltdown 
witnessed in the 2000s.‖ This period was marked by successive years of economic decline 
and a volatile socio-political environment that inspired emotionally charged ―regressive… 
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legislation which largely sought the political survival and overall control of citizenry…by the 
ruling elite (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012:220). This is the decade Zimbabwe began its 
redistributive policies on a large scale beginning with the compulsory acquisition of land in 
the early 2000s followed by the indigenisation of foreign-owned businesses around 2006. 
Overall, Zimbabwe‘s policy trajectory since 1980 to date has great attributes of distributive, 
redistributive and regulatory orientation. This is more prominent in the first and third decade 
after independence. During the first decade, the policies were largely welfarist in nature as 
the government assumed the role of providing for its people. In the third decade, government 
embarked on a series of redistributive programmes starting with the fast track land reform 
followed by the indigenisation programme. It is important to note that policy making in the 
third decade had a partisan, temperamental, exclusionary, hurried, and short-term bent (Zhou 
and Zvoushe, 2012) and was mainly motivated to meet political ends. It was only in the 
1990s, at the advice of the IMF and the World Bank, that Zimbabwe followed neoliberal 
policies but these failed to stir the country into economic prosperity. As such, they were 
abandoned in the late 1990s as the government reverted to a highly controlled policy stance. 
The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policy  
The indigenisation agenda, like the interventionism in the first decade of independence, is 
premised on the requirements for growth with equity, poverty eradication as well as socio-
economic transformation. In his presentation at the Africa Resources Investment Congress 
held in London in 2011, Prince Mupazviriho
1
 stated that Zimbabwe initiated the 
indigenisation and economic empowerment in the late 1990s. Government‘s first policy 
framework on indigenisation and economic empowerment was published in February 1998 
and this led to the establishment of the National Investment Trust of Zimbabwe. Its main duty 
was to facilitate the participation of indigenous Zimbabweans into the mainstream economy 
by giving them financial assistance.  
                                                          
1
 Prince Mupazviriho is Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and 
Empowerment in the Republic of Zimbabwe. The presentation: Unpacking Zimbabwe‘s Indigenisation  Policy, 
Legislation and Way Forward, was made in June 2011 (www.objectivecapitalconferences.com)  
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The policy was revised in October 2004 with the adoption of the Revised Policy Framework 
for the Indigenisation of the Economy. This policy framework provided the principles for the 
formulation of the current indigenisation and economic empowerment legislation. The 
parliament of Zimbabwe then passed the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act 
(Chapter 14:33) in 2007, and the Act was gazetted on March 7, 2008, and signed into law on 
April 17 2008 (Sokwanele, 2010). On January 29, 2010, government published the 
indigenisation regulations (i.e. Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) 
Regulations,  2010)  with respect to the Act that include the requirement for foreign owned 
companies operating in Zimbabwe to provide information about their indigenisation 
implementation plans to the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and 
Empowerment, by April 15, 2010 (Sokwanele, 2010).  
The main objective of the indigenisation and economic empowerment policy is to broaden 
the economic base through promoting ―mass economic justice to those whom justice was 
denied‖ (Watson, 2010), historically by the colonial system, and currently by ‗imperialist 
policies‘ of neoliberalism (Gowans, 2008; Mamdani, 2008; Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). First, 
the policy draws from the background of economic dispossession and deprivation of 
‗indigenous‘ Zimbabweans by the colonial system. Second, it is based on the further 
marginalisation of blacks from all sectors of the economy by [neo]-imperialist policies of 
neoliberalism advocated by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990s (Zhou and Zvoushe, 
2012). The policy seeks to ‗democratize‘ ownership of the country‘s productive assets as well 
as economically empower previously disadvantaged Zimbabweans by increasing their 
participation in the economy, thus facilitating their contribution to and benefit from the 
economic development of the country (Mupazviriho, 2011). Its vision is to create a new 
economy that is owned and controlled by indigenous Zimbabweans for their ultimate benefit, 
a new economy where Zimbabweans are ―masters of their own destiny‖ where they 
participate in their own social and economic enhancement (NIEEB, 2013).  
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Chapter 14 (33) of the IEE Act defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as, ―any person who, 
before April 18th, 1980, was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or 
her race, and any descendant of such person, and includes any company, association, 
syndicate or partnership of which indigenous Zimbabweans form the majority of members‖ 
(Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (IEE) Act, 2007; Matyszak, 2010). 
In order to broaden the economic base of Zimbabwe‘s economy, the IEE (General) 
Regulations of 2010 states that with effect from the 1st of March 2010, every existing 
foreign-owned business with an asset value of or above US$500 000 must, within five years, 
cede or dispose of a controlling stake of not less than 51 per cent of the shares to indigenous 
Zimbabweans. Failure to submit the forms, after a reminder, will render the owner of the 
business, or every director, guilty of an offence and liable to a fine and/or imprisonment for 
up to 5 years (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). The 51 per cent will be divided as follows; 10 per 
cent will go to an employee share ownership scheme or trust (ESOS/T) for the employees of 
the complying company, another 10 per cent will go to the local communities within which 
the business is operating and will be held under a community share ownership scheme or 
trust (CSOS/T), 15 per cent can be purchased by any indigenous Zimbabwean and 16 per cent 
will go to a National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (NIEEF). 
Mupazviriho emphasised that the programme is about partnership not expropriation or 
nationalisation. It is also about ensuring equitable sharing of the benefits of economic growth 
between foreign private investors and indigenous Zimbabweans who were hitherto 
marginalised. 
There are a number of players who are involved in ensuring the implementation of the IEE 
programme. There is the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenization and Empowerment 
(MYDIE), which is the core ministry responsible for the implementation of the IEE 
programme as well as the formulation of the IEE policy and strategies, Acts, Regulations. 
The ministry is responsible for receiving and approving IEE applications or proposals 
(Mawowa, 2013). It also liaises with other stakeholders, sector ministries, the National 
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Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board (NIEEB), IEE sectoral committees, the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and the Zimbabwe Youth Council (ZYC) among others 
on IEE issues. As provided for in the Act, the NIEEB should consist of a maximum of 15 
persons appointed by the Minister responsible for IEE. The Board is responsible for the 
management of the NIEEF, advising the Minister on the policy and overseeing compliance 
with the National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Charter. The NIEEF provides 
financial assistance for share acquisition, warehousing of shares under employee share 
ownership schemes or trusts. 
The Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010, as amended as at 25th Mach 2011, of the IEE (General) 
regulations provides for the establishment of Community Share Ownership Schemes/Trusts. 
CSOTs are seen as vehicles for broad-based participation in shareholding in various 
businesses operating in local communities. The proceeds from such participation shall be 
used for the provision of social and economic infrastructure in line with the priorities of the 
communities concerned (NIEEB, 2013). CSOTs are intended mainly to allow the residents of 
rural district council areas [which include communal lands] to benefit from businesses that 
exploit the community‘s natural resources through the transfer of a 10 per cent share stake 
(Sokwanele, 2010). The objective of CSOTs is to guarantee that the communities surrounding 
mining operations reap some benefits from the exploitation of the natural resource(s) in the 
area they inhabit. The indigenisation programme regards CSOTs as an effective mechanism 
through which the greater majority of indigenous Zimbabweans can participate directly in 
and benefit from the country‘s vast natural resources.  
However, the legal framework upon which CSOTs are established has been highly contested 
with critics questioning the legality of the scheme, with the likes of Tendai Biti
2
 charging that 
the schemes are ―a dubiously crafted piece of regulation in the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act which has no legal force.‖ The major borne of contention is that CSOTs 
are not mentioned in any of the initial indigenisation policy documents, i.e. the IEE Act 
                                                          
2
 Tendai Biti is the former Minister of Finance who was in office during the period of the Government of 
National Unity in Zimbabwe. Article accessed at: www.newsdzezimbabwe.co.uk 
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[Chapter 14:33] of 2008 and the IEE (General) Regulations, 2010. Only ESOSs are 
mentioned in the IEE (General) Regulations, 2010. CSOTs only appear in the revised 
Statutory Instrument 21 of the IEE (General) Regulations, 2010, as amended as at 25th 
March, 2011. Hence, for these critics the provision for the establishment of CSOTs is just a 
political gimmick by ZANU-PF to garner more supporters and placate public opinion towards 
the party (Mawowa, 2013). 
Nonetheless, despite the alleged legal irregularities within the IEE framework concerning 
CSOTs, Zimbabwe‘s current indigenisation legislation makes it mandatory for foreign-owned 
companies involved in natural resources exploitation to cede a 10 per cent share stake to a 
CSOT as provided in the amended Statutory Instrument 21. The operational framework for 
the CSOS formulated by the MYDIE (2012) states that a CSOT with wide representation 
should be established in order to ensure transparency, fairness, justice and equitability in 
resource utilisation. CSOTs are mechanisms through which local communities in resource-
rich areas become ‗masters‘ of their own destiny by enhancing their participation in finding 
solutions to their own problems (NIEEB, 2013). The CSOT is responsible for planning, 
designing, programming, implementation, monitoring, supervision and evaluation of 
development projects jointly with the communities to ensure ownership and sustainability of 
any development interventions. However, neither the operational framework formulated by 
the MYDIE or the amended IEE (General) Regulations, 2010 outline the ways in which 
‗wide representation‘ of resource-rich communities can be achieved. Further the policy 
framework does not state the role of local communities in these CSOTs.  
The amended Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations Statutory 
Instrument 21 (2010) states that a CSOS is set up for the benefit of the community in which 
resources are being extracted. The monies accruing to the scheme after the mining company 
from which the Trust is established has declared its dividends will be used for the 
maintenance of schools, educational institutions and provision of educational scholarships, 
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maintenance of hospitals, dipping tanks, roads, water works and also for environmental 
conservation through works such as gully reclamation.  
The argument here is that Zimbabweans should benefit from the extraction of their natural 
resources within Zimbabwe. As custodians of natural resources, communities are given an 
opportunity to derive livelihoods through directly benefiting from the mineral wealth within 
their localities. This initiative is expected to transform the socio-economic circumstances of 
communities in resource-rich areas through the implementation of development projects 
based on regulated partnerships between communities and business. Under this scheme, the 
conduct of business and sharing of profits should be done transparently, fairly, justly and 
equitably. 
Upon the establishment of a CSOT, though not legally bound, mining companies are 
expected to release certain amounts of money into the Trust through a ―gentlemen‘s 
agreement‖ between government and mining houses (Nehanda Radio, April 14, 2014). This 
precedes the transfer of the 10 per cent shares to the Trust and this money is called seed 
capital/money. Seed capital enables CSOTs to begin to implement their development 
objectives (NIEEB, 2013). A number of mining companies have pledged a lot of money 
during the launching ceremonies of various CSOTs around the country ranging between 
US$10 million to US$15 million (Mawowa, 2012). However, Tendai Biti questions the legal 
basis upon which companies are required to part with such huge amounts of money. There is 
no citation in the IEE Act that compels companies to donate money to a CSOT as seed 
money, and to this end, Biti contends that the mining companies are just arm-twisted to 
donate the money. Owing to such anomalies, there are a number of CSOTs that until now 
have not yet received their seed money pledged by the mining companies, thus stalling the 
operation of the CSOTs.   
The Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust in context 
As highlighted above, CSOTs are intended mainly to allow the residents of rural district 
council areas to benefit from businesses that exploit the community‘s natural resources 
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(Sokwanele, 2010). As such, the ZCSOT services the 19 rural wards under the Runde Rural 
District Council. ZCSOT was established against a backdrop of great abundance in mineral 
resources and persistent social and economic deterioration in Zvishavane. The Trust is 
presided over by the five chiefs in the district, Chief Mafala, Chief Mazvihwa, Chief 
Mapanzure, Chief Wedza and Chief Masunda. It has a Board of Trustees which comprises a 
representative of the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment 
(MYDIE), the chief executive officer of Runde Rural District Council, the Runde Rural 
District Council chairperson, the Zvishavane District Administrator, a representative of the 
mining companies, a lawyer and an accountant. Section 14B of Statutory Instrument 21 of the 
IEE (General) Regulations of 2010 prescribes that the Board of Trustees for CSOTs should 
also have a representative of the women, the youth and the disabled, but until now such 
groups are not yet represented in the ZCSOT. The indigenisation framework does not give 
detail as to how such representatives may be selected. This lack of clarity has given little 
commitment to the ZCSOT to ensure community representation in the Trust. 
The ZCSOT was established after two ―qualifying businesses‖ operating in Zvishavane had 
committed to meet the minimum indigenisation regulations by ceding each a 10 per cent 
share stake to the Zvishavane community, and these are Mimosa Mining Company and 
Murowa Diamonds (The Herald, December 13, 2011). At the launch of the ZCSOT in 2011, 
the two mining giants pledged seed capital amounting to US$10.5 million, with Mimosa 
pledging US$10 million while Murowa Diamonds promised US$500 000.00. Other 
―qualifying businesses‖ (as stated in the indigenisation policy) that are yet to guarantee 
shareholding for the Zvishavane indigenous community are Shabanie Mine, Sabi Gold Mine, 
Sabi-Vlei Mine, Drummond Quarries, Sigwanya Mine, Turn-off Mine and King Cobra Mine 
(NIEEB, 2013). As said above, Zimbabwe‘s amended indigenisation and economic 
empowerment regulations require foreign companies to meet a minimum indigenisation quota 
of 51 per cent, 10 per cent of which should be owned by a CSOT and the remainder by 
indigenous Zimbabweans. In 2011, Mimosa Mine was worth US$1 billion, meaning the 
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Zvishavane community owns about US$100 million of the giant platinum extractor (The 
Herald, December 2011). 
The IEE (General) Regulations (2010) state that communities benefiting from CSOTs should, 
through the participation of local communities, determine the priority areas appropriate for 
investing the monies accruing to the Community Trust such as building schools, hospitals and 
water works. This is in line with the principles of community development which is a process 
of transforming the socio-economic well-being of the whole community through active 
citizenship participation (Cary, 1970; Mathbor, 2008) and, for continuity, on the initiative of 
the community (Jeppe, 1985). Kariuki (2010) argues that contemporary community 
development policy insists that local communities should identify solutions to challenges 
arising in their area and participate in activities to address them. The ZCSOT, using the 
money given by the mining companies, is implementing various projects across Zvishavane 
that are aimed at enhancing the social and economic livelihoods of people in Zvishavane. 
Table 1.1 shows the list of projects that the ZCSOT has done around Zvishavane district. 
Project type Number  
Classroom blocks at different schools 17 classroom blocks with 2 classes each 
Staff houses at different schools and clinics 8 (F14) houses 
Boreholes  11 boreholes across the district 
Electrification 3 schools and 1 clinic electrified 
Sanitation 2 squat-hole toilets constructed at clinics 
Clinic construction 1 clinic constructed at Dayataya  
Agriculture  5 tractor disc ploughs 
Fencing 2 Primary schools 
Total number of people employed by the 
ZCSOT 
640 
Table 1.1: List of projects done by the ZCSOT (Information obtained from the ZCSOT 
offices in Zvishavane)  
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Description of research site 
Zvishavane district is a mineral endowed area with a vast of mineral resources such as 
platinum, gold, beryl, chromite, iron ore and diamonds. It lies 97 kilometres west of 
Masvingo on the main Bulawayo-Masvingo road. It boasts of big mining companies as well 
as other small ones; these include, Shabanie, Mimosa, Sabi Gold and Murowa Diamond 
Mines. Ironically, despite harbouring such vast mineral wealth, Zvishavane district is 
classified as a high poverty area with experiencing extreme conditions of social and 
economic deprivation, and this is attributed to poor rainfall patterns that are received in the 
area (Zimbabwe Parliament, 2011). Roads in this area are among the worst in the country. 
Moreover, the persistent social and economic deprivation in the face of mineral resource 
abundance brings to the spotlight the inherent inadequacies of unregulated mineral resource 
extraction activities to stimulate community development.  
Zvishavane is divided into two council administrations; there is the Zvishavane Urban 
Council and the Zvishavane-Runde Rural District council. The 2013 census report indicates 
that Zvishavane district has a total population of 115 372 people. However, the majority of 
the people reside in the rural communities, 70 047 (60.7%) while the urban area has a total of 
45 325 (39.3%) (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat), 2013). The population 
composition of Zvishavane district mirrors the general population composition in Zimbabwe 
between rural and urban areas where about 70-80% of the people in Zimbabwe reside in rural 
areas whilst the remainder stay in the urban areas (NIEEB, 2013).  
As indicated before, the ZCSOT caters for the rural communities under Runde Rural District 
Council. It is from these rural communities that mining activities are done. The main 
economic activities in Zvishavane‘s rural areas are communal farming and mining. A 
parliamentary report on Zvishavane in 2011 notes that illegal gold panning has emerged as a 
main source of livelihood for the constituency's residents (Zimbabwe Parliament, 2011).  
Zvishavane‘s rural communities consist of a total of 19 rural Wards under the traditional 
leadership of five chiefs that are Chiefs Mazvihwa, Masunda, Mafala, Mapanzure and 
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Wedza. The 19 rural wards in Zvishavane have a total population of 70 047 people, of which 
women number the majority 36 286 (52 per cent) and men are 33 761 (48 per cent) (ZimStat, 
2013).  
The rural communities in Zvishavane, like all other rural communities in Zimbabwe, are 
governed by customary law under the administration of traditional leaders. Zimbabwe‘s 
constitution recognises the institution of traditional leaders and it accords them the 
constitutional mandate to perform the traditional responsibilities of traditional leaders. The 
traditional roles of chiefs center on the administration of land and land rights. Bourdillon 
(1976) notes that traditionally, land belonged to the chiefs. As such, access to communal land 
is controlled by the chiefs and each of the five chiefs in Zvishavane presides over the 
allocation of land to their subjects in their respective chiefdoms. However, allocation of land 
for commercial or business purposes, such as mining, is administered by the state. The 
government has overall control over land which means the chiefs cannot do anything when 
mining activities expand into the agricultural land of their subjects. Nevertheless, the 
expansion of mining activities in Zvishavane‘s rural communities and other resource-
endowed communities across the country has in a way strengthened the powers of chiefs for 
it is out of the recognition of their traditional role as custodians of rural land that the 
government entrusted them to lead CSOTs. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the research questions and aims of this study. The main research 
question for this study was: Does community ownership of mineral resource wealth 
contribute to community development? And the aim is to investigate the contribution of 
community ownership of mineral resource wealth to community development. The chapter 
also went on to look at Zimbabwe‘s policy trajectory since Zimbabwe gained independence 
in 1980. An analysis of economic policy formulation and implementation in Zimbabwe 
shows that the socio-political environment in the country influenced policy decisions, hence a 
change in policies in the three decades after independence. I also focused on the IEE policy 
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and how from a policy point of view, it seeks to empower the greater majority of indigenous 
Zimbabweans who have been disempowered by the legacy of colonialism and continue to be 
disadvantaged by the neo-imperialist policies of neoliberal globalisation. In the process I then 
looked at the ZCSOT and how it was conceived with the aim of uplifting the social and 



















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter examines literature on community development, community participation and 
community empowerment, which are the theoretical concepts to be explored in this study. 
First, I will give a critique of the mainstream development paradigm enshrined in the market 
liberal perspective showing its shortfalls in stirring the socio-economic transformation of the 
lives of people in resource-rich areas. On this note, I examine the shortfalls of community 
development initiatives pursued under the banner of corporate social responsibility (CSR). I 
will concur with Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007) who raise the notion of ―the resource 
curse‖ as well as Akpan (2006), Mnwana and Akpan (2007) and Sirolli (2008) in their 
critique of CSR and its deficiencies in stimulating community development in resource-rich 
areas. Following this, I situate the indigenisation policy and CSOTs within the discourse of 
participatory community development as an alternative to market-based development under 
CSR which is often expert-led. The main argument is that state-induced community 
participation in the ownership and utilisation of natural resources is vital in ensuring 
equitable access to and sharing of the country‘s natural resources as well as benefits of 
economic growth.   
An overview of the mining–local community development nexus  
Natural resources around many rural communities are typically their most important 
economic asset; however they often have limited rights to use them and in most cases, 
powerful interests such as government and mining often claim exclusive access to these 
resources (Ford Foundation, 2010). Local communities are thus excluded from controlling 
the natural resources within their localities and hence from enjoying the benefits of resource 
extraction. Nevertheless, there is increasing convergence towards more participatory 
approaches that emphasise the involvement of local communities in the development of many 
resource-rich areas (Mawowa, 2013). This has largely been necessitated by the failure of 
market-based development strategies, which are expert-led and often exclude the poor, to 
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filter the benefits of macro-economic growth to the local communities from which resources 
are extracted. The inverse relationship between macro-economic growth and socio-economic 
transformation in resource-rich communities is more pronounced in resource rich countries 
such as Bolivia and the Niger Delta, which coincidentally rank among the most dangerously 
unequal societies in the world (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012).  
The prevailing reality where mining companies generate super profits while the communities 
within which they operate live in abject poverty qualifies Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz‘s 
(2007) postulation that the interaction between resource extraction (representing prosperity 
for a few) and local community livelihoods (representing poverty for many) is suggestive of 
societies characterised by ‗islands of prosperity and a sea of poverty‘. On this note, I agree 
with the authors as this scenario of ‗islands of prosperity and a sea of poverty‘ fittingly 
describes the socio-economic status in resource-endowed Zvishavane which has been 
declared a high poverty area (Zimbabwe Parliament, 2011). Globally, these inequalities have 
incited antagonistic relations, often violent, between mining corporations and local mining 
communities as is the case in the Philippines, Bolivia and the Niger Delta (Sawyer and 
Gomez, 2012).  
From a social justice perspective, mineral resource extraction should stimulate the socio-
economic transformation of the host communities (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). Ironically, 
most mining operations are located in communities with low levels of socio-economic 
development. Cronje and Chenga (2005) observe that communities surrounding South 
African mines are often synonymous with poverty, poor health, adult illiteracy and poor 
housing. Mining activities in many resource-rich communities fail to stir social and economic 
transformation, thus plunging these communities into ‗a resource curse‘ (Humphreys, Sachs 
and Stiglitz 2007).  
Locating the above observation within the wider global context, Bush (2008:361) asserts that 
the 21
st
 century race for resources in Africa by global capital has been coupled with growing 
despair from critics who lament that ―plunder and looting continues in a manner reminiscent 
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to the colonial past,‖ and in the words of former Gold Fields 3  chairperson Mamphela 
Ramphele quoted in McKenzie (2012), leaving local communities with nothing to show but 
―a hole in the ground with detrimental environmental consequences and a community mired 
in poverty.‖ Negi (2011) bemoans that the expansion of neoliberal globalisation in most 
Third World countries like Zambia and the preoccupation with profitability by private mining 
corporations have increasingly resulted in an inverse relationship between resource 
availability and social and economic welfare as their investments fail to stimulate local socio-
economic transformation. As such, a growing number of political forces such as NGOs, 
religious groups and ‗indigenous‘ or local communities themselves have voiced concern over 
the adverse effects of resource extraction activities on the livelihoods of local communities 
(Negi, 2011; Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). In this regard, I support state interventionism that 
seeks to promote community participation in resource ownership and utilisation, as is the case 
in Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation policy, as this can ensure equity in the distribution of mining 
revenues to host communities.  
It is becoming evident among policy makers that incorporating the participation of local 
communities in decisions concerning their lives as well as in resource utilisation will lead to 
greater protection and empowerment of indigenous communities, thus achieving greater 
social justice (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). Under Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation policy, CSOTs 
remain an important mechanism through which benefits from resource extraction extend to 
indigenous Zimbabweans by promoting broad-based participation in the shareholding of 
foreign-owned businesses. This is anticipated to go a long way in promoting the sustainable 
development of resource-rich communities in Zimbabwe (Matyszak, 2010; Zhou and 
Zvoushe, 2012). 
A critical review of CSR and its contribution to community development 
Generally, mining operations invoke prospects for better living to host communities, and this 
is commonly championed through corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. CSR refers 
                                                          
3
 Gold Fields is a globally diversified producer of gold with eight operating mines in Australia, Ghana, Peru and 
South Africa  (www.goldfields.co.za)  
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to business initiatives that a company adopts beyond its legal obligations in order to create 
added economic, social and environmental value to society and to minimise potential adverse 
effects from business activities (Masawi, undated). The fact that CSR goes beyond a 
company‘s legal obligations means that community development pursued under CSR is often 
regarded as philanthropic. It is conceived as a ―voluntary process whereby mining companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business‖ to build self-sufficient and 
self-reliant communities (Akpan, 2006).  
Often, CSR programmes include consultative interactions with community members on the 
projects to be undertaken. However, Sirolli (2008) contends that community development 
premised under the banner of CSR involves insignificant often minimum engagement with 
local communities, and in most instances, it is reduced to some form of token participation, a 
mere symbolic practice of engaging the local communities in informing them about certain 
decisions to which they have little or no power to affect (Ife and Toseriero, 2006). In fact, 
consultative processes in most CSR practices only ensure passive participation of community 
members but without the guarantee that their ideas or contributions will be incorporated 
(Mnwana and Akpan, 2007). Adding on, Akpan (2006) argues that most of the CSR 
programmes do not develop endogenously from the communities; rather they are externally 
conceived and directed by corporate experts. Consultative processes are habitually limited or 
non-existent and incorporation of the community‘s ideas is not guaranteed because mining 
companies as principal funders dictate the course of development. 
Akpan (2006), writing on transnational oil companies in Nigeria‘s Niger Delta region, 
laments that oil companies, because of their superior economic power frequently abuse the 
concept of CSR. He says these companies use CSR as an ―image management tool‖ and very 
often they pass non-existent or incomplete or abandoned community development projects as 
a way of presenting a good image of themselves to state authorities. In essence, the subtle 
exclusion of mining communities from actively participating in the development processes of 
their communities under CSR results in failure to address issues pertinent to community 
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needs as some of these projects are just done to present a good image of mining companies to 
the ruling elite or the corporate world. 
Moreover, Sirolli (2008) contends that processes of community development pursued under 
CSR are often imposed on local communities with no significant community participation 
and most of the time excludes the poor, women and other marginalised groups in society. As 
a result, such development initiatives are not context specific because of the minimum levels 
of participation of local communities; hence they ultimately fail to transform the living 
conditions of the rural poor in mining communities. As a result, mineral resource extraction 
would fail to produce the perceived socio-economic benefits such as clean water, improved 
housing, health and greater employment opportunities, which are some of the main socio-
economic challenges persistently encountered by resource-rich communities (Vertigans, 
2011). Sirolli (2008) then posits that because of lack of full participation of local 
communities, development under CSR often fails to last beyond the life of the mine because 
it does not emanate from the communities, and there is minimal local participation. Bridger 
and Luloff (1999) argue that expert-led development sustain relations of domination between 
corporate institutions and local communities, something they suggest contributes to the 
brevity of community development initiatives after the end of mining activities because there 
is little community ownership and empowerment.  
As an alternative, Bridger and Luloff (1999) opine that mining companies should conceive 
development initiatives that hinge on the participation of community members to ensure the 
―design of policies that are sensitive to the opportunities and constrains inherent in specific 
places‖. It is the aim of Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation programme to stimulate development that 
is context specific and people-driven by dismantling paternalistic relations of domination and 
dependence between mining corporations and local communities. This forms part of the main 
research question for this study: Does community ownership of mineral resource wealth 
contribute to community development? In this regard, the study sought to investigate whether 
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the ZCSOT is transforming the socio-economic conditions of people in Zvishavane through 
engendering their full participation in development.  
CSOTs are established to promote community participation and to empower local 
communities through direct shareholding in foreign-owned businesses operating within their 
localities as a means of building sustainable communities. The main objective of CSOTs is to 
ensure that communities, as custodians of natural resources, benefit directly from the 
extraction of natural-resource wealth in their areas and are able to shape their own 
development. As envisaged under the indigenisation policy, this initiative will transform the 
socio-economic circumstances of the communities concerned. Instead of depending on 
mining corporations or the government for socio-economic development, the communities, 
using monies accruing in their CSOTs, can undertake development projects that address their 
priority areas of concern. In essence, the transformation of rural mining communities through 
CSR initiatives have been found inadequate, hence the call for more participatory approaches 
that ensure the active involvement of mining communities in controlling natural resources 
and also in all stages of development (Cronje and Chenga, 2005; Akpan, 2006; Mnwana and 
Akpan, 2009 and Mnwana, 2011). Again, as part of the research question, the study sought to 
examine how the ZCSOT engender broad-based participation in the utilisation of mineral 
resources for community development. 
Basically, CSOTs, if properly managed, are an alternative mechanism to promote community 
development that can ensure the participation of local communities in natural resource 
utilisation and project implementation. Community participation is the basic principle of the 
discourse of community development, and, as said above, CSR measures do not sufficiently 
guarantee the participation of local communities. As a result, community development under 
CSR often fails to address the needs of the communities in question due to minimum levels of 
community participation in the process of development. Hence, more community 
involvement is needed in the process of development in order to ensure that resource 
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availability in resource-rich communities is matched with improved socio-economic 
standards. 
Community development as a language of empowerment  
Mining is a transient activity and this has prompted critics to question the ability of the 
industry to ensure sustainable livelihoods in the communities that host the mines which 
actually experience the deleterious impacts of mineral resource extraction. Negi (2011) notes 
that there is increasing discontent and loss of faith in the distributive capabilities of capitalist-
oriented market-based development to filter the benefits of development from the macro-
economy to local communities; hence the call to empower local communities through 
promoting their participation so that, for sustainability, they can ―define their own needs and 
identify ways in which these may be met‖ (Ledwith, 2011:14).  
Empowerment programmes in the Third World, particularly in Africa, are predominantly 
concerned with redressing the historical wrongs of marginalisation and exclusion of Africans 
in the mainstream economy dating back from the colonial era (Makwiramiti, 2011), and the 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programmes in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
are cases on point. Makwiramiti notes that empowerment policies are vital and are based on 
the reality that ―an economy can flourish if it can meet the needs of its citizens.‖ Therefore, 
the essence of empowerment programmes lie in achieving equitable distribution of the 
benefits of economic growth to the majority citizens in order to enhance their socio-economic 
welfare.  
Cary (1970) defines community development as a series of processes that give local 
communities greater control over social and economic conditions affecting their lives. At the 
center of community development is the empowerment of traditionally deprived social 
groups that were deprived of power and control over their common affairs; it involves 
changing the root causes of structural discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion 
(Ledwith, 2011). Talking about the marginalisation and exclusion of mining communities in 
South Africa, former Gold Fields chairperson Mamphela Ramphele observes that mining 
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activities in South Africa impacted on almost three-billion households directly or indirectly, 
and contribute over R70-billion per year to the country‘s wage and salaries. However, the 
ironic reality is that despite this seeming impressive picture, most of South Africa‘s mineral-
rich communities are ―home to the country‘s most underdeveloped and underprivileged 
communities‖ (McKenzie, 2012), thus invoking notions of islands of prosperity and a sea of 
poverty.  
On a similar note, Zimbabwe‘s president Robert Mugabe lamented the effects of denying 
resource-rich communities to enjoy the benefits of resource exploitation. He said because of 
this denial, ―…communities are bound to lose their confidence and will continue looking 
towards government and the donor community for development. General empowerment 
begins with making own decisions as opposed to being perpetual observers and recipients of 
charity acts‖ (NIEEB, 2013:2). More importantly, the empowering ability of community 
development hinges on the ability of local community members to work together and shape 
the social, economic and political circumstances affecting them through fostering genuine 
community participation at all levels of development. It aims at encouraging the 
establishment of institutional structures that foster genuine participation of community 
members in the process of development (Ledwith, 2011); and for this study, CSOTs are the 
case on point. To this end, one of the research questions seeks to find out how the ZCSOT 
engender broad-based participation of community members. However, Zhou and Zvoushe 
(2012: 219) contend that CSOTs in Zimbabwe ―have been dominated by men… leaving 
women and the youths on the side lines,‖ thus courting controversy around the issue of broad-
based participation.  
Ledwith (2011:14) posits that the motive of empowerment in the discourse of community 
development sets it ―at the interface of reactionary practice and revolutionary practice.‖ On 
the one hand, community development is determined to create opportunities to the previously 
disadvantaged members of society in order to uplift and empower them. On the other hand, it 
attempts to dismantle the structural factors that are viewed as the causes of inequality and 
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marginalisation. Likewise, Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation is both reactive and revolutionary in 
practice as confirmed by the following statement from The Herald: ―The principle of 
community empowerment is a calculated remedy to the historic socio-economic deprivation 
and disadvantages imposed on rural communities by colonialism's racial discrimination‖ (The 
Herald, April 9, 2013). CSOTs endeavour  to empower ‗indigenous‘ communities by 
guaranteeing them shareholding in companies exploiting resources in their localities in order 
to ensure equitable access to and ownership, control and utilisation of the nation‘s resources 
(Makwiramiti, 2011; MYDIE, 2012). A critical question to ask here is: How do different 
social categories of people in resource-rich rural communities benefit from the community 
development initiatives pursued through CSOTs? 
More than just giving communities an opportunity to partake in the broader economic affairs 
of the country, the indigenisation policy significantly changes the ownership structure in the 
mining industry. As such, the transfer of shares to a community trust is seen as one way of 
empowering the communities. CSOTs also compensate for the land that has been lost to 
mining companies. The communities will use the money accruing to the trust to implement 
projects of their choice. 
The imagined harmony model of ‘community’ in community development 
Mining indigenisation in Zimbabwe through the establishment of CSOTs suppose the 
eventual empowerment of the ‗community‘ in question. Also, ‗community‘ empowerment is 
central to the discourse of community development, in which all categories of people that 
constitute the ‗community‘ are included in the process of development. Notions of 
‗community‘ in the discourse of community development presume ‗community‘ as a 
sociological functional whole homogenous in composition and harmonious in social relations 
(Jeppe, 1985; Burkey, 1993; Craig and Mayo, 1995). To this end, Crehan (1997:11) posits 
that the idea of ‗community‘ tends to ―imply something that is bounded and homogenous,‖ 
and this is far from the reality. Indeed, such simplified conceptualisation of ‗community‘ is 
problematic because it does not acknowledge the socio-economic differences in many 
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communities. Likewise, rural communities in Zvishavane are not homogenous entities, rather 
people are differentiated on the basis of class or status, age and gender and this has effects on 
who benefit from the ZCSOT. Cheater (1999) laments that policy makers often fall into the 
trap of taking ‗community‘ in such simplified form. Burkey (1993) calls for the 
demystification of the ―harmony model‖ of rural community life, he emphatically states that 
rural communities are far from homogeneous entities. As noted by Crehan (1997), the key 
element of ‗community‘ as a social organisation is the social differentiated nature of people‘s 
locations within communities, what she refers to as the ―fractured communities,‖ fractured in 
terms of gender, age and relative wealth (Crehan, 1997:10). In fact, sharp contradictions exist 
among the rural people; there are elite versus non-elite relationships that give power to the 
dominant or elite. As highlighted in the profile of Zvishavane District, the notion of a 
homogenous community is non-existent.  
Mohan & Stokke (2000:253) contend that the term ‗community‘ in participatory community 
development is misleading in certain ways since it is never the poor who regard themselves 
as ‗community‘ but it is the term often used by state officials and outside organizations. This 
narrow conceptualisation of ‗community‘ in policy statements is dangerous as it frequently 
fails to achieve the stated preferred outcomes of empowering the whole community. The 
Participatory Institute for Development Alternatives (PIDA) cited in Burkey (1993) reports 
that most of the rural development initiatives in Sri Lanka have attempted to work with the 
perceived ‗harmony model‘ of village communities, ignoring the contradictions and 
conflicting interests inherent within these communities, and this negatively affected the 
development initiatives. To this end, PIDA pessimistically concluded that due to the 
differentiation of rural communities between the rich and the poor and the subsequent 
unequal nature of social relations, even the ―so-called neutral interventions would adjust to 
the dynamics of power relations and end up serving the dominant interests‖ (Burkey, 
1993:43). The complete oversight of the differentiated nature of communities often results in 
the empowerment of the local powerful elites who use their power to manipulate the entire 
process of community development (Mohan & Stokke 2000:253).  
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Is participation the next buzzword in development?
4
 
The indigenisation policy acknowledges the significance of empowerment through ‗broad-
based participation‘ in the process of social and economic transformation of resource-rich 
communities. Through CSOTs, Zimbabwe‘s ‗indigenous‘ communities can begin to ―freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources… in the exclusive interest of the people‖; a right 
guaranteed them by the African Charter (African Charter on Human and People‘s Rights 
(ACHPR), 1981; NIEEB, 2013). Mathbor (2008) posits that community development thrives 
on citizen participation, which is a social process that spurs a broad cross-section of the 
community to identify and articulate their own challenges, goals as well as design their own 
methods of development. In summary, citizen participation invokes a people-oriented social 
and economic development that involves ―tailoring the design and implementation of projects 
to the needs and capabilities of the people who are supposed to benefit from them‖ (Uphoff, 
1985:467). More importantly, local community people are keenly aware of their needs and 
have their own priorities; hence the need to promote local community participation at all 
levels of community development (Ibid). Burkey (1993) argues that the value of participation 
by every member of the community, including the poor, stems not solely from idealistic 
considerations of basic human rights or as a way of eliminating dictatorial/paternalistic 
alternatives, but also from the inherent persuasiveness of participation to articulate genuine 
needs and formulate measures that can be taken to meet those needs. 
Again, Burkey (1993) notes that in order for participation to realise the creative energies of 
the local people in problem identification and problem solving, it must be much more than 
just the mobilisation of labour or the convening of meetings where the poor are told about 
pre-determined plans. Ife and Toseriero (2006) suggest that through participation, as an 
integral component of empowerment, when more people participate, more ideals of 
community ownership and inclusive processes will be realised.  
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However, according to Burkey, most cases of participation in project design and decision-
making around the world are too often limited to village meetings where the project is 
explained and the people are asked to give their comments, and in most instances, the 
comments or suggestions are made by a few well-up people from the community in a 
language unintelligible to the majority. On a similar note, Uphoff (1985) laments that though 
these meetings are useful; they are only a transitory, short-lived form of group action. Besides 
such meetings mostly at the stage of problem diagnosis, quite a number of community 
development initiatives lack permanent structures for group action generated in beneficiary 
communities. Therefore, this form of participation, rather than empowering, disempowers 
mostly the poor people in local communities.  
Critics argue that forms of participation where intended beneficiaries participate in meetings 
but with little or no power to ensure that their decisions are heeded by the powerful always 
amount to insignificant forms of participation referred to as ―tokenism‖ (Arnstein, 1969; Ife 
and Toseriero, 2006). Token participation refers to a situation where intended beneficiaries 
are only informed about the programmes planned for them and are consulted, but the final 
decision is made by the elites, far from the majority. To this end, Arnstein (1969) declares 
that participation without power is an empty ritual and frustrating process for the powerless 
because they do not have any power to effect change in circumstances affecting them. 
Contrary to popular views on community development that sanctify participation, White 
(1996) proposes that participation must be seen as political because of the inherent existence 
of tensions with regards to who participates, how and on whose terms. White posits that 
participation, while it has the potential to challenge structures of domination; it can also 
degenerate into entrenching and reproducing existing power relations in local communities. 
In the discourse of participatory community development, participation is seemingly and 
often purportedly presented as an approach that promotes transparency, thus making it more 
appealing to people. In effect, this masks the fact that participation always takes multiple 
forms and serves different interests (Arnstein, 1969). These shortfalls of participation, if 
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uncritically observed, make the goal of participatory development unattainable. Again, 
considering these imperfections, the critical question to ask is whether participation has 
resulted in changing processes of development to achieve the desired ends by the concerned 
communities. It is the aim of this study to investigate how the ZCSOT engender the 
participation of community members in the process of development. This is important as it 
allows us to see the practicality of participation and its ability to champion people-centred 
development. 
Minderhoud (2009) laments that participation has become a ‗buzzword‘, which characterises 
the cultural and political values of the time (Cornwell, 2007), and because a buzzword can be 
used to symbolically support certain ideas and beliefs it can effectively become an 
―instrument of power‖ for the dominant in the process of development (Alfini and Chambers 
2007:492). In consideration of the contestations around participation in community 
development, it suffices to conclude that incorporating local communities does not 
spontaneously make the process of community development democratic and just (Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000). As already highlighted, local communities often include persistent structures 
of power, which, as a consequence, make participation take place on a more symbolic level 
while the actual decision making process takes place at a much higher distant level. 
Therefore, notions of ‗indigenisation‘, ‗broad-based participation‘ and ‗economic 
empowerment‘ need to be critically analysed to see whether they are not just marketing tools 
to sell Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation mantra. And the critical question to ask is: What is the 
form of participation engendered by the ZCSOT? Is it broad-based or elite-based? 
Empowerment problematised 
In the practice of community development, participation can be both a means to an end or an 
end in itself (Burkey, 1993). Overly, the goal of promoting participation is to achieve the 
empowerment of beneficiary communities to take charge of their own circumstances. To this 
end, Lord and Hutchison (1993) regard empowerment as a social-action process that 
promotes the participation of people and communities towards the goals of individual and 
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community control, political efficacy through decision making, improved quality of life and 
social justice. Empowerment initiatives are premised on the assumption that local 
communities possess knowledge of circumstances affecting their lives. As such, 
empowerment increases the ability of people to work together and have more power and 
influence over the conditions affecting them (Golding, 2012). Essentially, the community 
ownership of natural-resources envisioned in Zimbabwe through CSOTs seeks to empower 
local communities so that they are able to transform their living conditions using monies 
accruing in the CSOT.  
‗Empowerment‘ is often offset by equal loss and unequal gain; it involves the 
disempowerment of the formerly privileged and subsequent empowerment of the previously 
less privileged. Hence, it is seen as extremely divisive because it tampers with the status quo 
in natural resource ownership. Makwiramiti (2011) notes that in South Africa‘s 
empowerment programme, the concept of ―Black Economic Empowerment‖ means what the 
phrase says: empowerment of Blacks and disempowerment of Whites. However, the gains of 
empowerment are unequally enjoyed by the empowered group. In the case of BEE, it was 
christened ―Black Elite Enrichment‖ (Ibid). In the Royal Bafokeng Community, 
empowerment through the community ownership of mineral-resource wealth has been 
criticised for serving the interests of a few ―privileged male elders‖ who take part in 
community meetings (Mnwana and Akpan, 2009:289). In Zimbabwe, the concept of 
‗indigenisation‘ has the same connotations. The indigenisation programme exclusively takes 
race as the sole determinant factor of disempowerment, thus excluding other factors such as 
class, age, religious, ethnic and gender issues in the process of black empowerment 
(Gaidzanwa, 1999; Makwiramiti, 2011). Largely, the question of ―Who benefits?‖ is by no 
means inevitable. Does community empowerment through community control of mineral-
resource wealth ultimately translate into equity?  
In light of these problems, Makwiramiti (2011) notes that enormous controversy surrounds 
the radical implementation of empowerment programmes, and this makes their contribution 
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to economic development marginal or sceptical (Robertson, 2012). Most of these 
programmes seek to disengage from the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism which many 
Third World governments regard as imperialistic, hence they are predominantly driven by 
political motives, thus making their economic objectivity highly debatable and doubtful 
(Robertson, 2012). Asutay (2010) opines that the generality of ―people first‖ populist 
sentiments, for example in this case indigenisation, community ownership, participation and 
empowerment, are fraught with delusive political and economic concerns which are mainly 
aimed at winning popular votes as most of such policies are crafted towards election time as 
is the case with the indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe. Zhou and Zvoushe (2012) argue that 
Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation policy was politically motivated by the need to safeguard the 
political turf of ZANU PF and Street (2012) calls this ―manipulation of populism by the 
political elite.‖  
More often, empowerment programmes are emotionally charged, with the goal of achieving 
political redress to the previously disadvantaged masses. As such, the success of their 
implementation is mostly measured in the transfer of power or resources. However, critics 
argue that the goal of achieving the targets of resource ownership to the disadvantaged is 
―inadequate as an indicator of success if sustainable economic development and the reduction 
of rural poverty are the primary concerns‖ (Walker, 2007:142). For community ownership 
schemes, the transfer of resource ownership is not enough, rather there is need to ensure that 
mechanisms are in place that will allow all community citizens to benefit. 
Absence of such mechanisms expose community empowerment programmes through 
community ownership schemes to political manipulation by local elites (Fritzen, 2007), what 
is popularly known as ‗elite capture‘ (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Wong, 2010; Mnwana, 
2011). Elite capture refers to a situation where elites manipulate the decision making process 
so that they can usurp the benefits intended for the less privileged in society (Wong, 2010). 
Makwiramiti contends that the politicised nature of Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation programme 
makes it susceptible to manipulation and abuse by the political and local elites. The 
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indigenisation policy states that local chiefs should preside over Community Share 
Ownership Trusts. Community development, with its commitment to participatory 
approaches to development, is lambasted for its failure to embrace the existence of power 
relations in local communities, thus leaving room for elite capture (Wong, 2010). The Crisis 
in Zimbabwe Coalition (2012) bemoans the involvement of chiefs saying it weakens the 
programme‘s transparency given the political polarity in many rural areas and the fact that 
most traditional leaders in Zimbabwe are allegedly partisan in favour of ZANU-PF. This 
raises questions of whether it is possible for chiefs to be non-partisan in implementing the 
administering the CSOTs. Again, the MDC has been criticising ZANU PF of manipulating 
CSOTs as a campaigning tool for the elections (Chronicle, September 30, 2012). Robertson 
(2012) concludes that such manipulation of empowerment programmes for political 
popularity has caused self-inflicted suffering to the economy of Zimbabwe as many potential 
investors are now shying away from investing in such an uncertain environment, thus 
threatening the life of community share ownership schemes, and ultimately community 
development which is taking CSOTs as its lifeline.  
Traditional leaders, rural administration and their role in community development  
The institution of traditional authority is the common system of governance for most rural 
communities in Africa. The institution has roots in the history of traditional societies in 
Africa, more from the historical social organisation under kinship-based social relations 
(Crehan, 1997). What is interesting is the evolution of the traditional systems of governance 
from the pre-colonial through the colonial to the post-colonial era and their co-existence with 
and adaptation to the modern systems of governance in both the colonial and post-colonial 
periods.  
Prior to the colonisation of Zimbabwe, rural areas were under the leadership of traditional 
leaders. The institution of traditional leaders is a product of the kinship-based social relations 
that characterised most of the pre-colonial African societies with chiefs being the pinnacle of 
the pyramid of kinship representing the widest net of authority. The relations of kinship were 
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instrumental in naming the contours of legitimate authority. What this means in a rural 
political economy is that those who dominate local politics would justify and maintain their 
dominance over those people they rule by ―appealing to the imagined obligations of kinship‖ 
(Crehan, 1997:87), which also make them seen as ‗fathers‘ by their subjects (Bourdillon, 
1976). As such, relations of kinship legitimise the power of traditional leaders and the 
subjects often see the person of the chief as signifying a form of power that is total and 
absolute, unchecked and unrestrained (Mamdani, 1996). 
Though acknowledging their existence even in the pre-colonial African states, a number of 
scholars concur that modern systems of rural governance in Africa have been reinvented or 
recreated by the colonial administration and adopted by post-colonial governments 
(Mamdani, 1996; Crehan, 1997; De Visser, Steytler and Machingauta, 2010). The present 
rural local government system in Zimbabwe can be traced to the Native Boards established in 
the 1920s during colonialism. The Native Boards were the mechanism through which 
traditional systems of authority were co-opted into the colonial administration as a form of 
what Mamdani (1996) refers to as ―indirect rule‖.  Even in post-colonial states, Rangan and 
Gilmartin (2002) assert that traditional authorities can be used by national governments to 
maintain ‗indirect rule‘ over rural communities, a system that Mamdani (1996) describes as 
‗decentralised despotism‘. 
Traditionally, chiefs are the guardians of the life of their people. They are seen as the owners 
of the land (Crehan, 1997) and ―life comes from the land of which the chief is the owner‖ 
(Bourdillon, 1976). As owners of the land, chiefs were thus responsible for the prosperity of 
their people, particularly for the land and its produce. Zimbabwe‘s 2013 Constitution 
recognises the institution, status and role of traditional leaders and accords them the 
responsibility to perform the ―traditional functions‖ of a traditional leader such as facilitating 
development (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013) as well as administering rural land use (Negi, 
2000; De Visser, Steytler and Machingauta, 2010). Negi (2000:210) realises that as mining 
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activities expand into the rural communities, ―chiefs emerge as important gatekeepers of 
valuable mineral resources‖.  
In effect, the development of mining activities in rural areas has strengthened the authority of 
traditional chiefs as they are now at the centre of development, bringing development to their 
people. One of the common arguments in defence of chieftaincy today is that chiefs, because 
of their moral obligation as custodians and traditional fathers to their people, they are 
regarded as representatives of the people they lead and seen as able to raise matters of local 
concern (Negi, 2000). In South Africa‘s Rustenburg District of the North West Province, 
traditional leaders, as the traditional representatives of local communities, have been deeply 
involved in overseeing the mining of platinum on the land they control so as to ensure that 
their communities benefit (Mnwana and Akpan, 2009; Manson, 2013). Zimbabwe‘s CSOSs 
borrow from South Africa‘s Royal Bafokeng community in Rustenburg, and chiefs are 
mandated to chair the CSOTs. However, Mawowa (2013) notes that CSOTs in Zimbabwe 
have the risk of elite manipulation by chiefs, who preside as the chairpersons of the CSOTs, 
and because of their inclination with ZANU PF, which is the chief architect of the 
indigenisation policy; their actions are hardly monitored or questioned. Also, Negi (2000) 
laments that taking chiefs as representing the interests of the people they lead sometimes 
result in them being the direct beneficiaries of certain material benefits intended for the 
community as a whole. In most instances, community development tends to coalesce rural 
communities in the traditional sense, regarding chiefs ―not only as the means of reaching the 
people, but also as its very embodiment‖ (Negi, 2000:229). This therefore makes it 
imperative to analyse the role played by traditional leaders in community development. 
Focusing on the involvement of chiefs, this question needs to be addressed: What is the 






CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the methodology used for data collection in order to answer the broad 
research question: Does community ownership of mineral resource wealth through 
Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs) contribute to community development? The 
chapter gives a description of the research approach, research methods, sampling approach as 
well as a description of the research site. I also present the data collection process and my 
fieldwork experience. Furthermore, methodological considerations are highlighted with 
regards to how the choice of a particular research method and data collection process may 
have impacted on the findings of the study. Ethical issues that were pertinent to this research 
are raised as well as the challenges and limitations of the study.  
The greater part of this study was qualitative; hence it drew some valuable theoretical 
aspirations from ontological and epistemological assumptions. I acknowledged that meanings 
attached to people‘s everyday experiences are highly subjective and socially constructed; 
therefore I used direct quotations from the interviews as evidence to build on the themes that 
I discovered from the study. Though I had very limited time to establish deep interactive 
relations with the research participants, I was able to be with them, spent some time with 
them, and in the process they would show me some of the projects done by the ZCSOT. I 
established a rapport with them and this was useful as I was able to see some information that 
might be difficult to express during the interviews.  
Research approach 
This research utilised a methodological triangulation approach, which refers to the use of 
more than one method in data gathering and analysis. Triangulation is a multi-method 
approach to investigating a research question that ―enhances confidence in the ensuing 
findings‖ (Bryman, 2001). Following Denzin‘s (1970) distinctions of triangulation, the study 
used a ―between-method triangulation‖ which refers to the combined use of both qualitative 
and quantitative research methods. In order to combine the two methods, I used an 
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explanatory design in which I made a follow up to the quantitative approach (survey 
questionnaire) with a qualitative approach (in-depth interviews), exploring the projects being 
done by the ZCSOT in Zvishavane, the processes of interaction between the ZCSOT and the 
Zvishavane communities as well as the ways in which people are benefiting from the 
ZCSOT. Methodological triangulation was useful because it gave a complete set of findings 
and provided a better understanding of the contribution of the ZCSOT to the social and 
economic transformation of people‘s lives in Zvishavane‘s rural communities.  Essentially, it 
enabled me to check the validity of the findings by cross-checking data from the two methods 
in order to reduce the uncertainty of the propositions and increase the validity of the 
generalisations made thereafter (Webb et al, 1996).  
Sampling 
Since I used a multi-method approach for collecting data, I used different sampling 
techniques for each method. From the survey questionnaire, I wanted to gather information, 
from a wide cross-section of people, pertaining to their understanding of the ZCSOT, their 
participation and how they benefit from the projects implemented by the Trust. The aim was 
to get a broad-based overview of how the ZCSOT works; whether it incorporates wider 
community participation and also how community members benefit from the Trust.  
In order to get a more general picture on the ZCSOT, I used simple random sampling for the 
survey. Simple random sampling is a probabilistic technique that ensures each person 
remaining in the population has the same probability of being selected for the sample 
(Frerichs, 2008). According to Schutt (2012), every element selected through random 
sampling is selected on the basis of chance through a random process. I randomly selected 
fifty respondents for the survey from six villages under Chief Mapanzure. However, even 
though the selected sample gave a general picture about the ZCSOT and how it operates, 
assuming that every community member has an equal chance of exposure to the Trust since it 
operates in their community, I admit that the sample size was too small to be representative 
of the views of all the people in Zvishavane. Transport challenges and the relatively small 
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amount of time I had constrained me from reaching out to a larger sample large enough to be 
representative of the Zvishavane communities. 
For the in-depth interviews, I used two different sampling techniques because I had targeted 
two groups of respondents. In order to get answers relating to community members‘ 
understanding of the ZCSOT, their participation as well as the ways in which they are 
benefiting from the Trust, a sample of twenty respondents was selected. These were selected 
using stratified random sampling. Stratified random sampling is a probabilistic sampling 
technique that involves splitting the population into different strata, and the strata are chosen 
to divide the population into different categories important for the research (Schutt, 2012). 
The population was divided into age and gender categories of male and female youths (18-25 
years) and adult males and adult females (26 years and above) so that I could explore how 
different categories of people perceive the role of the ZCSOT to community development and 
also how they participate and derive benefits from the Trust. 
Another sample comprising key informants was selected. Since I wanted information from 
people who are well versed with the operations of the ZCSOT, who understand the Trust 
from both a policy and practical point of view, I selected the sample using purposive 
sampling. Purposive sampling is a non-probabilistic sampling technique in which elements 
from the population are selected on purpose (Schutt, 2012). This allowed me to get 
information from a sample that is knowledgeable about the operations of the ZCSOT. As 
such, members who constitute the Board of Trustees for the ZCSOT were selected. These 
were the administrator of the Trust, the chairperson of the Trust who happens to be a chief, a 
traditional leader, the district administrator and a representative of the MYDIE.  
Research methods 
a) Questionnaire  
I started the data gathering exercise by administering a survey questionnaire to a sample of 
randomly selected respondents. The questionnaire was written in English and administered in 
a rural set up which presumably has lower literacy levels, as such, in order to avoid the risk of 
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getting poor results due to misinterpretation of the questions, I administered the questionnaire 
myself in the native language ChiShona, in the form of face-to-face structured interviews.  
Bryman and Cramer (1990) note that face-to-face administered questionnaires ensure a better 
response rate despite being time consuming. Despite it being taxing for me to move around 
the six sparsely populated villages, I was able to retain all the questionnaires that I intended 
to do. I administered the questionnaires in places that were convenient for the respondents, 
mostly in their homes. Most of the questions were closed questions, and Converse and 
Presser (1986) lament that these questions restrict people from giving elaborate answers as 
they are forced to choose their answer from the alternatives provided rather than answering in 
their own words. However, these questions were specific and communicated the same frame 
of reference to all respondents, thus making it easier to measure and detect differences 
between respondents. For example, the closed questions were quick to show the differences 
on people‘s involvement and participation in the Trust. The survey clearly revealed that 
participation of the community members in choosing people who constitute the Board of 
Trustees for the ZCSOT is not influenced by any of the categories that I had suggested, i.e. 
age, gender or class as 98 per cent of the respondents said they do not participate at all in 
choosing the people who constitute the Board of Trustees. This helped me to find some 
themes that I was able to pursue for the in-depth interviews which came as a follow up to the 
questionnaire. 
b) In-depth interviews 
In-depth face-to-face interviews formed the primary data collection method for this research 
because they provided a deep inquiry into the contribution of the ZCSOT to the social and 
economic transformation of Zvishavane‘s rural communities. Boyce and Neale (2006) define 
in-depth interviewing as a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive 
one-on-one interviews with a small sample of respondents in order to get an understanding of 
their views on the subject under study. To this end, Webb and Webb (1932) cited in Legard et 
al (2003: 138) describe the interview method as a ―conversation with a purpose‖ that should 
resemble a natural conversation. For the interview to resemble a natural conversation, 
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Mertens (1998) suggests that the interview guide needs to be designed in the local language. I 
took note of Mertens‘ suggestion and conducted the in-depth interviews in the local 
vernacular, besides for only two interviews with the key informants who preferred to be 
interviewed in English. Generally, there were no language barriers.  
Nonetheless, some of the interviews I conducted with ordinary community members were far 
from resembling a natural conversation. This was due to the politicisation of the CSOSs prior 
to the July 31, 2013 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe. In such instances, the people were 
suspecting that, as a stranger to them, I was collecting the information for political purposes; 
hence some refused to be recorded and others opted not to be interviewed altogether. 
Conducting one-on-one interviews with people as an outsider has great disadvantages, 
especially when the subject of enquiry is seen as sensitive, in this case, politically. My 
presence as a researcher might have been intimidating to the respondents and therefore 
prevented them from conversing with me naturally. Some even refused to be interviewed 
saying they feared for their lives, this was something I did not anticipate. As a result I could 
not interview all the respondents that I had proposed to interview. I intended to conduct 
twenty in-depth interviews with ordinary community members but I managed to do fifteen 
and out of those fifteen, only six consented, verbally but refused to sign the consent forms, to 
have the interviews audio recorded. In order to counter this challenge, I would first go and 
introduce myself to the village head (in one instance I had to call the chief to authorise one 
village head to allow me conduct the interviews as he said I should have a formal letter from 
the chief). Once the village head gave me the green-light to conduct the interviews I would 
tell the respondents that I was given the authorisation by the village head and after this some 
would verbally consent to do the interviews. 
Despite the challenges, the respondents gave me more detailed information concerning 
community knowledge about the ZCSOT, their participation in decision making, the power 
dynamics at community level as well as the ways in which they were benefiting from the 
Trust. In social science research, in-depth interviews are popular for their ability to get deeper 
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and rich information as the researcher is able to probe further on aspects that are ambiguous. 
However, I found probing among those who were not much comfortable to be interviewed 
very discomforting to them especially when we were discussing issues concerning power and 
transparency in the way the Trust is being run.  
I also conducted four in-depth interviews with key informants who constitute the Board of 
Trustees for the ZCSOT. These interviews were important as they gave me insight of what 
the indigenisation policy entails in as far as community development through CSOTs is 
concerned. 
Data collection experience 
I started the data collection exercise in late June 2013. When I carried out this study in 
Zvishavane, I was an outsider and the subject of my study was, as I discovered during the 
data collection exercise, politicised. Because of the politicised nature of CSOSs, most people 
were not at liberty to discuss about the ZCSOT to strangers. I heard that the reason for this 
restriction was that ZANU-PF, which was the chief architect of the indigenisation policy, was 
trying to contain ill-publicity of CSOSs before the July 31
st
, 2013 elections. Because ZANU-
PF‘s election manifesto was anchored on indigenisation and economic empowerment, I 
heard, journalists from some independent media houses were spreading information to 
discredit the indigenisation programme and CSOTs. As a result, I went through a very long 
process of vetting from government officials in the MYDIE at national level, provincial level 
and the district level. The officials wanted to ascertain the authenticity of my identity as a 
student as well as the reason for doing the research, i.e. for academic purposes.  
Firstly, I went to seek the permission from the chief so that I could conduct the research on 
the ZCSOT in his area of jurisdiction. The chief then referred me to the administrator of the 
ZCSOT saying he cannot permit me to do the research without the approval of the 
administrator. At the ZCSOT offices, I was asked to get authorisation from the MYDIE‘s 
national offices in Harare. I went there and was further referred to the NIEEB which is the 
national board responsible for the compliance of foreign companies to the country‘s 
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indigenisation regulations. After a series of examination from the officials at the NIEEB, I 
was referred to the NIEEB provincial offices in Gweru, Midlands Province, where I was 
given the green-light to conduct the research in Zvishavane. However, I should commend that 
besides this rigorous process of examination, I did not face any other obstacles throughout 
my fieldwork, and the officials from NIEEB and the ZCSOT were very supportive. At one 
time, an official from ZCSOT offered to assist me with accommodation in Zvishavane. 
Before I started collecting data, I made appointments with the prospective respondents and 
we would set a date that was convenient to both of us. Almost all the data was collected from 
the respondents‘ homesteads. The data collection process was two-phased and this was 
necessitated by the research approach that I used, methodological triangulation. First, I 
administered the questionnaire to forty nine respondents whom I had categorised on the basis 
of age and sex. Notable in this data collection exercise was that I managed to balance the 
gender composition of my respondents, reaching out to twenty four males and twenty five 
females. This was quite useful since I wanted to measure if participation in and deriving of 
benefits from the ZCSOT was influenced by gender or age. However, in my survey I failed to 
reach out to elderly respondents (60 years and above) though I managed to balance the youth 
(18-29) and the middle-aged (30-59). This, in particular, paints a picture of the demographic 
composition of this rural community as well as a general demographic picture of Zimbabwe 
which as of February 2013, the average life expectancy was pegged at 51.82 years (Mundi 
Index, 2013). I administered the questionnaires myself, having to travel for distances in the 
sparsely populated rural villages under Chief Mapanzure. This helped me to get an almost 
100 per cent response rate. During the process of administering the questionnaire, I did not 
have any problems with the respondents because the questions were closed ended. They did 
not have to explain much. 
After the survey, I set down to establish the most recurring issues from the survey so that I 
could follow up on those issues with the in-depth interviews. I then went back to Zvishavane 
in early September to do the in-depth interviews. I managed to do nineteen interviews in 
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total, fifteen with ordinary community members, four with key informants who were 
members of the Board of Trustees for the ZCSOT. I was recording the interviews, but some 
of the respondents refused to be recorded citing political reasons. Because I went for the 
interviews a month after Zimbabwe‘s 2013 harmonised elections, some respondents were 
suspicious that I was collecting the information for political purposes. The situation was 
aggravated by the fact that I was a ‗stranger‘, though I had met most of the respondents in 
July when I first administered the questionnaire. This was despite me producing all my 
identifying documents that were confirming that I am a student and the research was for 
academic purposes.  
Nonetheless, I managed to establish a good rapport with almost all the respondents and in 
most cases whenever I reached a homestead, I was offered water to drink even without 
asking. I learned that this was a cultural gesture among the community members to show that 
they were accommodating me as a stranger. And as a stranger, to return the gesture, they 
expected me to drink the water, even just a sip if I were not thirst. Again, my presence as an 
outsider at some point motivated the respondents to say a lot of things pertaining to the 
ZCSOT. Some people felt that since they hardly meet the people from the Trust, they got the 
opportunity to raise their concerns to me. Some would even go on despite me telling them 
that I do not work for the ZCSOT but they would insist, “…we want you to tell the people 
from the Trust that this is what the people are saying” (Interview: Tendai; 03/09/2013).  
For both interviews and the survey, respondents were asked to sign consent forms, but almost 
all the ordinary community respondents refused to sign the consent forms. The moment I 
produced a consent form asking for their signature and a tape recorder, they became 
suspicious and others ended up refusing to be interviewed at all. I then resolved not to ask for 
their signatures and I just asked for their verbal consent. For all the interviews that were not 
recorded, I transcribed them, immediately after each day‘s fieldwork, using the detailed notes 
I wrote during the interview sessions. Furthermore, in order to substantiate on the projects 
implemented by the ZCSOT, I took some pictures of these projects after I got the permission 
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to do so from the chief. I got the permission to take the pictures of the classroom blocks built 
at Sevanga primary school from the school‘s headmistress. Again the villagers from Nyathi 
Village consented, verbally, to be taken a picture whilst they were fetching water from one of 
the community boreholes drilled by the ZCSOT. 
The problem of translation  
Most of the interviews were done in local vernacular, ChiShona, only two were conducted in 
English and for these two I barely had translation complications. Conducting the interviews 
in the respondents‘ native language was crucial in creating an interactive relationship 
between me and the research respondents and also to ensure that the conversations flow 
naturally (Webb and Webb (1932) cited in Legard et al, 2003; Mertens, 1998). However, I 
faced a complex task of translating the interviews from ChiShona into English during the 
process of transcribing. In some cases, it was a challenge for me to find an equivalent word in 
English with the same untainted meaning from the ChiShona word. For example, referring to 
how chiefs cannot be challenged during a meeting, a respondent said; “…nekuti Mambo 
havapikiswe pane zvavanenge vataura” (Interview; Tawanda; 09/09/2013). Despite me 
having literally translated this to English to mean, “…because the chief cannot be opposed on 
what he says”, this English translation does not capture the same cultural connotations of the 
original statement. While the conventional meaning of the word ‗oppose‘ in English may 
mean just giving a contradictory view, in this context, the Shona statement has a deep cultural 
connotation of being disrespectful to the institution and person of the traditional leader, and 
this is not fully captured in the English translation. 
Data analysis 
The study used both quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques. For the quantitative 
data, I used simple descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics describe the basic features of 
the data in study. It forms the basis of all quantitative analysis of data (Le Compte and 
Schensul, 1999). It is a process where the researcher reduces quantitative data to a story and 
its interpretation, thus making sense of the data. In this study, descriptive statistics gives a 
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descriptive measurement of ordinary community members‘ participation in the ZCSOT and 
how they derive benefits from the Trust, and this informed the qualitative analysis. 
Le Compte and Schensul (1999) note that data analysis for qualitative techniques such as in-
depth analysis tends to be an on-going process that takes place throughout the data collection 
process as the researcher thinks about and reflects upon the emerging themes, adapting and 
changing the methods if required. This study used thematic analysis, highlighting the key 
themes that emerged from the study. Anderson (2007) argues that thematic analysis portrays 
the content of interview transcripts and it identifies common and sometimes recurring themes 
in the texts provided. The researcher distils a list of common themes from the texts and then 
groups them in order to express common elements emerging through participants‘ voices. At 
this stage, interpretation is kept to a minimum and only once quotes have been organized 
thematically does the actual interpretation process begin (Anderson, 2007). 
Following this approach, I engaged myself in a lengthy process of data processing, reducing 
the bulk of the raw data from the transcripts. I organised certain quotations from the 
interviews using the thematic approach. I arranged the data in themes that show how the 
CSOT contributes to community development, showing also some of the factors that can 
inhibit the realisation of community development such as power dynamics and corruption.  
Ethical considerations 
The Wits Research Ethics Committee (non-medical) granted ethical clearance for this study 
after I submitted the proposal. Ethics are essential to any study and they are a legitimate and 
moral way of carrying out a research. For this study, community members were interviewed 
on the role of the CSOT to community development, hence the basic ethical considerations 
were taken note of. Before I commenced the interviews, I gave a courtesy call to the 
traditional leader who then gave me the green-light to proceed with my interviews in his area. 
All the interviews were conducted after the respondents consented verbally to be interviewed 
and/or recorded. I made sure that I did not act against the will of those who did not want to 
have their voices recorded by not recording the interviews. I also got prior consent from the 
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responsible authorities and the research participants involved (or from the caregivers of the 
research participants involved) in taking pictures of some of the projects done by the ZCSOT. 
Participants were not obliged to answer any questions that they did not want to and they were 
informed that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time, should they feel 
uncomfortable. I also assured the respondents of confidentiality and instead of using their real 
names, I used pseudonyms.  
Limitations  
The overall purpose of this study was to explore the contribution of community ownership of 
mineral resource wealth through CSOTs to community development, with particular 
reference to the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust. However, the major 
limitation of the study was that the survey that was conducted together with the interviews 
might not be that representative of the whole Zvishavane District‘s rural areas that is serviced 
by the ZCSOT. The survey together with the interviews was done in the area under Chief 
Mapanzure because this was the most accessible area for me considering the limited period 
and resources that I had. I could not go around to other places around Zvishavane because of 
transport and financial challenges. As such, a broad-based research might be needed that 
covers the whole district of Zvishavane. Nevertheless, the relatively small sample for both the 
survey and in-depth interviews gave me essential information concerning the operation of the 










CHAPTER FOUR: REVERSING THE „RESOURCE CURSE‟ THROUGH MINING 
INDIGENISATION  
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the social and economic conditions in 
Zvishavane‘s rural communities in the face of natural resource abundance. In essence, it 
gives a picture of the social and economic status prevailing in many resource-rich areas. As 
highlighted before, Zvishavane‘s rural communities have been declared high poverty areas 
and the results of this study confirm that the communities are highly impoverished despite the 
existence of mineral resource wealth. As will be shown, people in Zvishavane contend with a 
myriad of challenges, both at household and community level. The levels of household 
income are low and as a dry area, people experience severe shortages of water for domestic 
and agricultural purposes, infrastructure development in the area is very poor and this affects 
service delivery in the health and education systems. Most worrying is that the socio-
economic challenges evident in Zvishavane‘s rural communities could be abated had the 
mining companies operating in Zvishavane honoured their obligations under CSR.  
I will concur with Sachs and Warner (2001) and Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007) on the 
concept of the resource curse as well as Akpan (2006), Mnwana and Akpan (2007) and Sirolli 
(2008) in their critique of CSR to enhance the welfare of people in resource-rich 
communities. It is against this background of social and economic misery juxtaposed with 
natural resource abundance that the ZCSOT was established. The ZCSOT, as machinery for 
social and economic transformation is implementing a number of projects to solve the 
challenges being experienced by people in Zvishavane. The existence of social and economic 
misery in Zvishavane testifies the failure of unregulated market-based development to 
enhance the wellbeing of people in resource-endowed areas, hence the justification of state 





Is natural resource abundance a ’curse’ to resource-rich communities?  
Zvishavane district is endowed with numerous minerals such as platinum, gold, beryl, 
chromite, iron ore and diamonds. In addition, the district boasts of big mining companies as 
well as other small ones; these include, Shabanie Mine, Mimosa Mine, Sabi Gold Mine, 
Murowa Diamonds Mine, Sabi-Vlei Mine, Drummond Quarries, Sigwanya Mine, Turn-Off 
Mine and King Cobra Mine. All these mining companies extract mineral resources from 
Zvishavane‘s rural communities. A community member, Tawanda‘s response confirms the 
abundance of mineral resources in Zvishavane; “Zvishavane is rich, God blessed us with 
minerals, we have gold, we have diamonds, we have chrome” (Interview: Tawanda; 
09/09/2013). The fact that Zvishavane is a hive of mining activities raises expectations that 
the people there are better off, benefiting from the economic activities happening in their 
communities.  
Nonetheless, despite harbouring such vast mineral wealth and being home to a number of 
mining houses, Zvishavane district is classified as a high poverty area (Zimbabwe Parliament, 
2011). Resource extraction in Zvishavane which has been in existence for years has failed to 
transform the rural communities‘ social and economic conditions of living. Peter, a young 
unemployed man bemoaned this scenario saying;  
―Mining companies just come and extract our minerals and make their profits then take 
away all the money leaving us with nothing but huge pits that frequently pose danger to 
our lives and our livestock‖ (Interview: Peter; 09/09/2013).  
The above sentiments confirm the observation made by the Ford Foundation (2010) that 
despite natural resources around rural communities being typically their most important 
economic asset, the communities have limited rights to use them. The people are excluded 
from controlling their resources; instead, powerful interests in the form of extractive 
industries often claim exclusive access to such resources. Prior to the implementation of the 
indigenisation policy, mineral resource extraction in Zvishavane could not stimulate the 
development of local communities surrounding the mines as mining companies, despite 
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making profits, invested very little in the communities, thus showing the inadequacies of 
unregulated market-based development under CSR.  
As is the case in other parts of the world, resource extraction activities are notoriously known 
for leaving a dent on both the environment and the life of surrounding communities, thus 
leaving them in worse off conditions (Mamphela Ramphele in McKenzie, 2012; Sawyer and 
Gomez, 2012). Explaining this situation, Tendai, a female adult said;  
“… we were not benefiting at all, what they (mining companies) only leave for us are 
pits which are dangerous to our lives, our livestock and the environment. Here a Grade 
5 girl died in May this year when she fell in one of those open pits” left by a closed 
mine that was mining chrome (Interview: Tendai; 03/09/2013). 
Therefore, the social and economic status of Zvishavane‘s rural communities perfectly 
resembles the condition of a ―resource curse‖ and it evokes imaginations of a society 
characterised by ‗islands of prosperity and a sea of poverty‘ (Sachs and Warner, 2001; 
Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007). The concept of the resource curse has been supported 
by data analysis across a large sample of resource-rich communities, for example the Niger 
Delta, which demonstrate negative correlations between resource availability and improved 
social and economic well-being (Ville and Wicken, 2012). This is confirmed by the responses 
from this study where respondents bemoaned the discordant co-existence of mining activities 
and high levels of social and economic deprivation in Zvishavane.  
Bush (2008:361) laments that in the race to the bottom that is characteristic of the global 
competition for resources by multinational companies, ―plunder and looting continues in a 
manner reminiscent to the colonial past.‖ In the same way, respondents accused mining 
companies of “plundering our resources, leaving us with nothing to show for the minerals we 
have” (Interview: Tendai; 03/09/2013). Another respondent, James, a village committee 
secretary said mines have been “short-changing us for a long time, they were stealing our 
minerals because, despite the mining they were doing and the profits they were making, they 
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were not investing back in our communities” (Interview: James; 04/09/2013). Therefore, as 
highlighted by Gowans (2008) and Mamdani (2008) it can be argued that unregulated 
market-oriented economic processes which borrow from the neo-liberal ideology by calling 
for minimal state intervention promotes neo-imperialist expansion in the Third World in 
which global capital enriches itself at the expense of the social and economic well-being of 
Third World peoples. This means that without any form of state intervention, resource-rich 
communities will be further impoverished despite the existence of minerals as was the case in 
Zvishavane before the establishment of the ZCSOT. 
The persistent deterioration of the social and economic conditions of living in resource-rich 
areas such as Zvishavane questions the ability of top-down market-based approaches to 
development to fulfil the promise of trickle down effects into the peripheries where resource 
extraction is done. Zvishavane is involved in heavy extractive industrial activities as mining 
houses extract the resources from underground, some registering super-profits but investing 
little to nothing towards improving the conditions of people residing in these areas. Hence, 
critics of neoliberalism call for the state to discipline capital, to ensure that capital investment 
also benefits local citizens (Polanyi, 1944; Stiglitz, 2002). The promulgation of the 
indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe is a form of state interventionism that makes it mandatory 
for foreign owned mining companies to cede 51 per cent of their shareholding to indigenous 
Zimbabweans, 10 per cent of which goes to local communities. This is another dimension of 
state-induced benefit sharing between mining companies, local communities and indigenous 
citizens at large (Mawowa, 2013).  
According to Ville and Wicken (2012), recent studies have provided something of a 
counterbalance to the resource curse indicating that the curse is not inevitable and that natural 
resource wealth can be instrumental in transforming the social and economic well-being of 
resource-rich societies. In order to counter the resource curse obtaining in resource endowed 
communities, the government of Zimbabwe sought to promote social justice by ensuring that 
local communities in such areas benefit from the extraction of the country‘s natural resources 
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through partaking in the ownership and utilisation of natural resource wealth. The mechanism 
through which this is achieved is the CSOT which holds shares in trust for the communities 
in question. Drawing from an interview with one of the key informants, ―CSOTs are a 
mechanism through which local communities benefit directly from the exploitation of their 
own natural resources” (Interview: Mr Tsungai; 05/09/2013); hence natural resource 
availability can now stimulate development in resource-rich areas.  
Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation policy is premised on the realisation that unregulated market-
based economic systems are unable to entrench the benefits of natural resource extraction to 
the wider society (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012; Mawowa, 2013), hence the need for state 
interventionism to ensure equity and benefit sharing. As such, the redistributive character of 
the indigenisation policy makes it reactionary and revolutionary in practice; reactionary in 
that it seeks to promote equitable distribution of the country‘s resources, and hence benefits 
of economic growth to the formally disadvantaged citizens. On the other end, its 
revolutionary intent is evident in its endeavour to dismantle the racialised, since colonialism, 
access to the natural productive assets (NIEEB, 2013). With regards to this, a key informant 
said;  
“CSOTs are meant to address the problem that was there before and after 
independence where the God-given resources were not equitably distributed, it was 
benefiting only a few, let me say whites. So CSOTs are meant to redistribute wealth to 
the generality of the Zimbabwean citizens who have been excluded from having such a 
privilege from colonisation” (Interview: Mr Tsungai; 05/09/2013). 
The economic justification for the indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe rests upon its 
empowerment agenda that seeks to promote ―mass economic justice to those whom justice 
was denied‖ (Watson, 2010), historically by the colonial system and currently by ‗neo-
imperialist policies‘ of neoliberalism (Gowans, 2008; Mamdani, 2008). Mawowa (2013) also 
notes that the indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe recognises the right of Zimbabweans to 
benefit from their God-given resources as a means of attaining social justice. To this end, 
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CSOTs in Zimbabwe are established to facilitate the redistribution of mineral revenues to the 
rural communities so that the communities in resource-rich areas can start their own 
development. This indicates that with some form of state interventionism that ensure equity 
in the access to mineral resources, the resource curse obtaining in many resource endowed 
communities can be avoided, thus supporting Ville and Wicken‘s (2012) postulation that the 
resource curse is not always inevitable. 
Mining and corporate social responsibility or corporate social ‘irresponsibility’  
I tried to explore more on the reasons why an abundance of mineral wealth in Zvishavane co-
existed with abject poverty. Even though I managed to get some useful insights from the 
respondents which I related to literature on CSR, I could not make a complete argument 
because I failed to get the corporate side of the story from the mines. Efforts to get an 
appointment with the responsible authorities from the mines were futile as they claimed to be 
busy. I wanted to hear their side of the story on the projects they are implementing in 
Zvishavane‘s rural communities, if any, and how these are helping people.  
A traditional leader lamented that before government‘s intervention through the 
indigenisation policy, the mining companies would just come into the area with the sole 
purpose of making profits with little or no concern about the well-being of the communities. 
He said; 
“These people were only concerned with making profits, they would just come here, do 
their mining and after making profits, they go. When they start their businesses, they 
would make no efforts to liaise with us as a community, we were not given a chance to 
tell them what we expect from them, they made their agreements with government and 
not with us. Some could not even close the pits they opened here; they just leave them 
like that. To them, what matters is profit, what happens to us is none of their business” 
(Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013). 
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Masawi (undated) attests that CSR activities should create added economic, social and 
environmental value to society so as to minimise potential adverse effects from business. 
The best way mining can benefit local communities is through engagement with local 
mining communities. Hence, failure to engage them before extracting minerals from their 
land shows some form of ‗irresponsibility‘ on the part of mining companies.  
Another key informant, Mrs Chepiri who is a member of the board of trustees said the 
projects that were done by the mining companies before the institutionalisation of the 
indigenisation policy were less known to the rural people;  
“Go right now into the villages and ask them what Mimosa or any other mining 
company did for them, they will tell you nothing. Serve for a few projects done around 
Zvishavane town; nothing has been done in the rural areas. If they do something for the 
community, it will be one thing in a very long time” (Interview: Mrs Chepiri; 
05/09/2013).  
A community member also concurred with Mrs Chepiri. Asked if there are any projects done 
by any of the mining companies operating in their area, she said, “No. Here, there is 
nothing” (Interview: Rumbidzai; 03/09/2013). The above sentiments indicate that mining 
companies, because their motives are pre-dominantly market-driven, to make profits, their 
concern with the well-being of people in communities from which they extract the mineral 
resources is peripheral and insignificant. This therefore shows the inadequacies of liberal 
market-driven development processes to transform the living conditions of people in 
resource-rich areas. 
Masawi (undated) posits that mining companies, under the principles of CSR, have the moral 
obligation to stimulate the development of communities within which they operate or get 
their labour supply from. However, the responses above point that mining capital‘s 
investments in the rural communities is negligible or non-existent. Critics of CSR argue that 
it is only used as an image management tool by mining companies with no tangible 
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programmes done for community development (Akpan, 2006). Again, Mr Mutongi‘s 
sentiments above show that mining companies make little or no effort to establish any social 
contract with local communities through which the communities, as owners of the resources, 
can make their demands or expectations. This confirms Sirolli‘s (2008) contention that CSR 
measures by mining companies often involve minimum often insignificant engagement with 
local communities. As a result, CSR fail to take into consideration the needs of local 
communities.  
In addition, there is growing concern over the commitment of mining companies to life 
changing programmes in the communities that harbour the resources they extract. Recently in 
Zimbabwe, there was a public outcry from the Centre for Natural Resource Governance 
(CNRG)
5
. The organisation pointed that some CSR activities undertaken by mining 
companies were ―misplaced priorities‖ that do not benefit the affected communities at all. 
The organisation was referring to Mbada Diamonds which sponsors the biggest football 
tournament in the history of Zimbabwean football, the Mbada Diamonds Cup, for a 
whooping one million United States dollars (The Financial Gazette, October 31, 2013). And 
the people in Marange from which the diamonds are being mined do not benefit anything 
from the one million dollars. Some respondents in this study raised similar concerns on what 
Mimosa Mining Company is doing. Asked if any of the mines have done something for the 
community, a 26 year old man, Peter, said;  
“Umm, for us nothing at all, we only know of Mimosa. It is sponsoring a football club 
in Zvishavane called Platinum FC, but we can’t say we get something from that, we 
don’t get anything from the football team” (Interview: Peter; 09/09/2013).  
Platinum Football Club‘s players are among the best paid footballers in Zimbabwe, but the 
communities adjacent to the mining site, which bear the environmental, social and economic 
                                                          
5
 CNRG is a registered Trust operating in Zimbabwe. The organisation is a civil society‘s response to lack of 
accountability and transparency on the management and utilisation of natural resources in Zimbabwe. It works 
with communities, extractive industries and local authorities to open dialogue and monitor adherence to 
acceptable CSR practices and human rights (www.cnrgzw.org) 
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costs of resource extraction, get nothing from this. This qualifies Akpan‘s (2007) contention 
that CSR is an image management tool by corporate entities who present a good image of 
themselves to state authorities and the corporate world. This results in them prioritising 
certain things that have nothing to do with transforming the socio-economic conditions of 
living of people in resource-rich areas.  
The establishment of the ZCSOT together with the release of ‗seed capital‘ of US$10 million 
by Mimosa Mine and Murowa Diamonds brought prospects of social and economic 
transformation as this money is being used for various projects around Zvishavane (NIEEB, 
2013). Seed capital is the money which mining companies pledge to give to the communities 
as they wait to finalise the 10 per cent share transfer to CSOTs. Mr Tsungai, a key informant 
said, “The mining companies have released seed money which is money they have to pledge 
to the communities for the activities they have been doing with very little being done in the 
communities” (Interview: Mr Tsungai; 05/09/2013). It is this money which the ZCSOT is 
using in rehabilitating infrastructure at hospitals and schools. Of this money, a traditional 
leader said, “We were really happy to receive that money because it’s now enabling us to do 
a lot of things which the mines were unable to do for us for a long time” (Interview: Mr 
Mutongi; 04/09/2013). 
Socio-economic challenges in Zvishavane and the responses by the ZCSOT 
I now turn to the social and economic challenges being faced by people in Zvishavane and 
will also show how the ZCSOT is responding to mitigate these challenges. It is these 
challenges that the mining companies operating in Zvishavane failed to respond to despite 
operating there for a long time, thus plunging the resource-rich district into the resource 
curse. The failure by these companies to transform the socio-economic conditions of living in 
the areas they do their businesses, the respondents revealed, is due to lack of commitment by 
private corporate institutions to plough back in the communities they operate in. Hence, this 
justifies the interventionism by the Zimbabwe government through the indigenisation policy, 
53 
 
making it mandatory for these private foreign owned companies to cede 10 per cent 
shareholding to local communities.  
Unemployment 
Unemployment is among the numerous of challenges persistently confronting people in 
Zvishavane‘s rural communities. It is more rampant among the youth. This is despite the 
existence of potential employers in the form of mining companies in the district. According 
to Sawyer and Gomez (2012), natural resource extraction has the potential to offer 
employment opportunities to local communities, and this is one way the communities can 
benefit from the availability of resources in their localities. However, the presence of mining 
companies in Zvishavane has not been that beneficial to the local communities‘ unemployed. 
Tawanda, an adult male community member lamented;  
“Our children are educated but are unemployed. What hurts us the most is that mines 
do not employ our children; they take people from other districts. We do not take any 
pride in the mineral wealth in our district because we are not benefiting at all 
(Interview: Tawanda; 09/09/2013).  
Also one of the trustees had this to say about the failure of mining companies to employ 
people in Zvishavane‘s rural communities;  
“When a mine is opened in an area, people start thinking of getting jobs in the mine, 
but this is not the case here in Zvishavane. Just go into the rural areas, the youth are 
not employed and the mines cannot take them even to do menial jobs. So the Trust is 
good for us, we are trying to give those youths some jobs, even though on short term 
basis” (Interview: Mr Daka; 09/09/2014).  
The foregoing sentiments echo the observations made by Cronje and Chenga (2005) who 
note that many resource-rich communities in South Africa contend with high levels of 
unemployment despite the heavy presence of extractive industries. Also, commenting on the 
South African mining industry, Mamphela Ramphele said mining activities in South Africa 
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contribute over R70-billion a year to the country‘s wages and salaries (McKenzie, 2012). 
However, this seemingly impressive picture is tainted by the existence of unemployment in 
the country‘s resource-rich areas (Cronje and Chenga, 2005; Vertigans, 2011). The failure of 
mining companies to employ local people is the cause of many conflicts between local people 
and mining corporations especially in the Niger Delta (Sawyer and Gomez, 2012). It is also 
proving to be fanning discontent among local people in other parts of Zimbabwe especially in 
the diamond fields in Manicaland where locals are engaging in conflicts with the mines 
because they are not getting employment from the mines (The Standard, November 17, 
2013). To this end, the NIEEB (2013) proposes that under the new indigenisation regulations, 
there is need to ensure a quota system through which all the villages in Zimbabwe‘s resource-
rich communities benefit through the employment of some of their unemployed people.  
 The ZCSOT has responded to the problem of unemployment, though on short term basis, by 
contracting the local people during the construction of various infrastructures in schools and 
health service centres. A number of people from the rural areas of Zvishavane were employed 
during the various construction activities undertaken by the ZCSOT. Since indigenisation is 
about opening up opportunities to the local people, the implementation of the projects by the 
Trust ensured that local people got the opportunities first as remarked by the Mr Mutongi 
concerning the employment of locals during construction activities by the ZCSOT;  
“…we said our people from surrounding communities should be employed to do the 
menial jobs during the construction at schools or clinics so that they can help 
themselves. We told contractors not to bring their relatives; they should get the general 
hands from here” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
Another key informant also said; 
“If we construct a clinic, when it is being constructed, the local youth and women will 
be employed, the contractor will be from within the community or the district. So the 
people benefit through getting employment during construction and improved health 
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services after completion. Even during electrification, local people will be employed as 
general hands…” (Interview: Mr Tsungai; 05/09/2013).   
People from the community also lauded the remuneration system of the ZCSOT saying it 
was better than what the mines can even offer for a one month‘s salary. A youth 
respondent said;  
“I was employed during the construction of the classroom blocks at Govarizadze 
Secondary School. The money was just good. As a youth I was able to do certain 
things for myself and even helped with buying food for my family” (Interview: Peter; 
09/09/2013). 
However, because the CSOT only employs locals for a short period of time, its 
contribution to providing lasting solutions to the problem of unemployment is highly 
negligible. Nevertheless, Burkey (1993) supports the creation of employment 
opportunities in some community development initiatives arguing that it makes the 
mobilisation of labour from local communities easier, thus offering an opportunity for 
better incomes.  Table 1.1 above shows that the ZCSOT, during the implementation of its 
various projects across Zvishavane, was able to employ a total of 640 locals.  
Local people are also empowered through being given first preferences when opportunities 
for tenders to do projects in the community arise;  
“We give first preference to those who come from our communities before we employ 
someone from Harare or Masvingo. That’s what we have agreed, but the person should 
have the minimum requirements” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/092013).  
Since it is a prerequisite that one should have the required documentation to be able to secure 
a tender, the traditional leader said the Trust is helping local people to form their own 
companies so that they secure the tenders;  
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“Now we are empowering them so they can have papers. The problem with these 
people is that they can do the job properly but they do not have the necessary 
documents, they don’t even know about the tax clearance certificate. So now as chiefs 
we are making sure that these people can get the required papers so that they can also 
start recognised companies” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
The respondent above highlighted that most of the projects that have been undertaken by the 
ZCSOT were done by people from Zvishavane‘s rural areas who were encouraged to come 
together to form and register their companies. They encouraged people with genuine artisan 
qualifications in such trades as building, carpentry and welding. After these people have 
registered their companies, then they would be given the job. In this way, the ZCSOT can be 
lauded for empowering the local people who were encouraged to form their own companies. 
Low levels of household income 
The study established that a lot of people in Zvishavane have very low levels of household 
income which makes it difficult for them to meet their household needs. From a social justice 
perspective, mineral resource extraction should offer opportunities for livelihood 
transformation to resource-rich communities (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 2007; Sawyer 
and Gomez, 2012). This can be through opening up opportunities for employment, thus 
improving the people‘s income levels. However as already indicated earlier mining activities 
in Zvishavane have provided very little opportunities for employment of the local people, and 
this explains the low levels of household income in the rural areas.  
From the survey data, the majority of the respondents, about 91.8%, revealed that they earn 
their household income from informal sources and these include farming (where they sell 
some of their agricultural produce, vegetables from their small gardens as well as livestock), 
gold panning, pottery for some women and traditional beer brewing for some households. 
Only 8.2% of the respondents said they rely on formal employment for their household 
income. The reason why most people rely on informal sources for their household income is 
attributable to the failure of mining companies around Zvishavane to provide employment to 
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the locals. Generally, it would be expected for these mining companies to offer employment 
to the locals, which will contribute in improving their household earnings. As highlighted by 
former Gold Fields chairperson, Mamphela Ramphele, on the marginalisation of mining 
communities in South Africa, mineral-rich communities are ―home to the country‘s most… 
underprivileged communities.‖ This is despite the seemingly impressive picture that mining 
activities in South Africa contribute over R70-billion per year to the country‘s wage and 
salaries (McKenzie, 2012). An adult woman, Jessica, had this to say about the source of 
income in her household;  
“No one works here (in the household). I sometimes brew traditional beer, we also 
keep small livestock and we can sell them. My husband does a lot of carving such 
things as yokes and mortar. So this is what we do for survival in order to meet our 
household needs and to send our children to school” (Interview: Jessica; 06/09/2013).  
Actually, most of these people rely on multiple informal activities for their household 
incomes. This validates Ersado‘s (2006) study that shows that rural households in Zimbabwe 
have a more diversified portfolio of income based on informal economic activities.  
However, what is worrying is that these informal activities do not generate enough income 
sufficient to meet household needs such as food, clothing, health and paying school fees for 
children. The majority of households surveyed, about 75.5% said they do not meet their 
household needs at all. This can be attributed to low levels of income mainly due to 
unemployment. Also, the situation for those who rely on selling agricultural products is 
aggravated by the poor rainfall patterns that are characteristic of Zvishavane. Conversely, 
about 25.5% said they sometimes meet their household needs. This qualifies Chambers‘ 
(1983) comments on informal activities by the rural people when he said wherever they are 
done, these activities have low productivity and they bring very low returns.  
Low income at the household level in Zvishavane is one challenge that the ZCSOT has failed 
to respond to effectively at the moment. The study has shown that though there are long term 
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plans by the CSOT to start projects on enterprise development and irrigation little has been 
done so far to address the challenge of low levels of household income. A community 
member said;  
“We are really happy with the CSOT. It’s building us schools and drilling boreholes 
but we want to say we also need money to meet our daily needs. So if they can find a 
way of helping us start income generating projects we will be happy. Right now there is 
nothing the Trust is doing towards this” (Interview: Tendai; 03/09/2013) 
The above response shows that the ZCSOT has done little to address the problem of low 
income at household level. However, if it was such a critical challenge to the people and with 
the emphasis on broad-based participation in problem solving, one would expect it to have 
been addressed through income generating projects as suggested by the respondent. On this, a 
key informant said they have not yet started such initiatives because of funding; 
“We have not yet received our dividends for the 10 per cent shares we have in Mimosa 
and Murowa Diamonds. Once we start receiving them, and after completing 
infrastructure development, we will start enterprise development projects to improve on 
people’s household income” (Interview: Mr Tsungai; 04/09/2013). 
Nevertheless, the ZCSOT needs to be lauded on the employment opportunities it avails to 
the locals during construction activities as this also contributes to improving household 
income to those that get employed. 
 Poorly developed school infrastructures 
Infrastructure in most schools in Zvishavane has been in a bad state for long despite the 
existence of mining operations in Zvishavane. Mining companies are expected, through the 
acceptable practices of CSR, to ―behave ethically and contribute to the social and economic 
development of the local community‖ in which they are operating in (Masawi, undated), and 
infrastructural development in terms of constructing schools, health centres and roads fall 
under this. However, this is not the case in Zvishavane. Mining companies in Zvishavane 
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have done very little to ensure that the rural communities in Zvishavane benefit from their 
CSR obligations. Most of the schools in Zvishavane‘s rural areas have poor infrastructures 
with “… poor ventilation. And under such conditions, the children will sleep while the 
teacher is teaching” because the classrooms are very hot “like an oven” (Interview: Rudo; 
02/09/2013). Moreover, some of “the old blocks are cracked and the roof is in a bad state, 
with the rains coming, [parents] fear that [their] children are not safe.” (Tendai; 03/09/2013). 
For fear of the safety of the school children, at some schools, children “were learning from 
outside or in church buildings” (Interview: Memoh; 02/09/2013). This is clear testimony of 
the failure of unregulated mining development to enhance the social and economic well-being 
of people in resource-rich areas. Figure 4.1 below shows the state of one of the old classroom 
block at Sevanga Primary School that had to be destroyed because it was no longer safe for 
learning. 
 
Figure 4.1: An old classroom block at Sevanga Primary School, Zvishavane district 
Poor infrastructure and lack of proper accommodation for staff at rural schools is alleged to 
be contributing to high staff turnover in Zvishavane‘s rural schools. A parent from the 
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community said, “… our school has failed to retain qualified teachers for a long time. They 
just come and in a few months they are gone, and we are given a new teacher” (Interview: 
Admire; 07/09/2013). At one school, four teachers share a five-roomed house together 
because of shortage of teachers‘ houses. The traditional leader complained that because of 
this the schools in the rural areas are unable to retain qualified staff;  
“Just go at our school, the teacher’s houses are in a pathetic state. You can’t imagine a 
teacher living in such conditions, and the mines were not helping out. Because of that, 
most of our schools were failing to retain permanent teachers, and it’s killing the 
education of our children here” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
In respect of this, Chevedza, Wadesango and Kurebwa (2012) posit that high staff turnover in 
schools militates against the provision of quality education, and stop gap measures such as 
the hiring of relief teachers does not offer any lasting solutions. All in all, poor infrastructure 
in Zvishavane‘s rural areas is seen as contributing to the lowering of the education standards 
in these areas.  
The ZCSOT identified deteriorating infrastructures in schools as hampering the delivery of 
quality education to the rural communities. As such, it has responded by resuscitating the old 
infrastructure, building new classroom blocks, teachers‘ houses as well as replacing the old 
furniture in schools. The people in the communities commended the work being done by the 
ZCSOT in improving the delivery of education in the rural areas. A respondent said;  
“With the new classroom blocks, our children can now learn in an enabling 
environment, the ventilation is good unlike the old blocks. We are also able to attract 
and retain qualified staff because the Trust has tried to ease the accommodation crisis 
(Interview: Rudo; 02/09/2013). 
 The people expressed their happiness in what the Trust is doing in the schools, something 
which the government or the mines could not do for years. The traditional leader said;  
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“What we have achieved through ZCSOT so far in schools could take our Rural 
District Council or government or even these mines years. In a space of six months we 
were able to put different structures at eight schools” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 
04/09/2013).  
The above sentiments support Burkey‘s (1993) observation that people-driven development 
initiatives are able to quickly and effectively respond to the needs of communities unlike 
bureaucratised macro-economic development. In this regard, the ZCSOT is commendable for 
its efforts towards improving the infrastructure in Zvishavane‘s rural schools in order to 
improve the delivery of education. Table 4.1 shows that the Trust was able to construct 6 F14 
houses for teachers in different schools. Figure 4.2 below shows one of the new blocks built 
by the ZCSOT at Sevanga Primary School. 
 





Poor health delivery system 
Zvishavane‘s rural communities also experience poor health delivery due to poor 
infrastructure which again is the cause of high staff turnover and shortage of staff at some 
clinics. A parliamentary report on Zvishavane in 2011 established that Zvishavane‘s rural 
health centres are experiencing extreme shortages of qualified health personnel, with most 
health centres being understaffed with not more than two qualified nurses (Zimbabwe 
Parliament, 2011). One key informant believe the reason for the shortage of qualified health 
personnel in most of Zvishavane‘s rural health centres is because of poor infrastructures at 
these health centres especially staff houses; “No trained nurse would prefer to stay in those 
houses. As long as we have such poor houses for our health staff, we will continue failing to 
attract and retain qualified personnel” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/3013). Another 
respondent said as long as there is poor infrastructure “with no electricity, no water…” 
Zvishavane‘s rural health centres will not be able to attract qualified nurses (Interview: 
Admire; 07/09/2013). All this point to the failure of mining companies operating in 
Zvishavane to plough back in the communities and do projects that can improve the health 
delivery system in Zvishavane, which is one of their obligations under the principles of CSR 
(Masawi, undated; Akpan, 2006). However, from an analytical point of view, it also needs to 
be brought to attention that the shortage of staff in Zvishavane‘s rural schools and clinics 
cannot be singularly attributed to poor infrastructure only. Instead, general factors like the 
economic meltdown, political instability experienced in the country as well as the inability of 
government to provide better salaries to its civil service also contribute to the shortage of 
qualified staff in the rural areas. Therefore, when political figures such as traditional leaders 
raise sentiments that attribute the shortage of staff to poor infrastructure, it shows how they 
are trying to find a scapegoat to accuse for the deteriorating service delivery in the country. 
The ZCSOT is responding to the problems of poor infrastructure in the rural health centres in 
order to improve on health delivery. A key informant said; “We electrified Ingome Clinic and 
we built two nurses’ houses at Zvegona Clinic and we have constructed a clinic at Dayataya. 
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We believe this will go a long way in transforming the health delivery system in the rural 
areas of Zvishavane” (Mr Tsungai; 04/09/2013).  
Acute water shortages  
Naturally, Zvishavane is a dry area, and the people in the rural areas are the hardest hit by the 
acute shortages of water both for domestic and agricultural purposes.  Realising this problem, 
the ZCSOT has drilled a number of boreholes around the rural areas in Zvishavane. The 
drilling of boreholes has reduced the distance rural people have to travel to fetch water. The 
Women‘s Coalition in Zimbabwe (WCoZ) laments that water shortages mostly affect women 
and girls who, because of their domestic responsibilities, ―spend long hours trying to secure 
this basic resource for their households, in addition to other domestic duties‖ (NewsDay, 
December 4, 2013). WCoZ‘s remarks were reiterated by a female respondent who said;  
“The most serious problem we had here was water. We used to travel more than 10 
kilometres in search of water. You know in our culture women are responsible for such 
domestic duties, so we would push 50 litres of water in a wheelbarrow for that long 
distance, you can imagine (Interview: Katherine; 02/09/2013).  
The challenge of water for domestic use was extremely felt by elderly people who are 
household heads. They would sometimes rely on the able-bodied members of the rural 
community who would assist them with water. Concerning this, an adult woman said;  
Imagine an elderly woman like me going for 10 kilometres with a bucket of water on 
the top of my head. If it was not for our neighbours who would help me here to fetch 
water, we had a crisis in this household (Interview: Tendai; 03/09/2013)  
Another male respondent bemoaned the acute shortages of water in Zvishavane saying it 
prevents them from doing certain agricultural production to supplement their food. He said;  
“Because we don’t have water here, we are unable to grow vegetables. You know small 
gardens are a necessity in a rural area because we don’t need to buy vegetables every 
day, where do we get the money? (Interview: Tawanda; 09/09/2013).  
64 
 
Growing vegetables in small gardens is a means for survival in many rural areas in 
Zimbabwe. It supplements their food and reduces costs on food as they are able to get the 
vegetables from their gardens.  
The ZCSOT is doing a great job in trying to ease the water crisis in Zvishavane‘s rural 
communities. The respondents revealed that most of the boreholes that were drilled by 
mining companies were no longer functional and the mining company has not been 
forthcoming in rehabilitating the boreholes. On this, James said; “We asked the mine to 
repair the borehole that used to service this area but they didn’t do anything” (Interview: 
James; 04/09/2013). The failure by the mining company to rehabilitate the borehole that it 
had given to the community confirms Akpan‘s (2006) argument that mining companies are 
unable to maintain most of the projects they do under CSR. More often, Akpan observes, they 
pass projects or structures that are no longer functioning as if they are still operating. To this 
end, it is not surprising to find that borehole in the records of the mining company can be 
seen as still functioning.  
Most of the respondents applauded the ZCSOT saying it is doing a great job in trying to solve 
the water crisis in Zvishavane‘s rural areas. To date, it has drilled thirteen boreholes including 
five boreholes drilled on each chief‘s homestead.  
The drilling of boreholes has been commended as liberating women from travelling long 
distances. As said earlier, women take the responsibility of fetching water for household use. 
The drilling of boreholes by the ZCSOT now allows them to have more time to do other 
household duties as pointed by Memoh; “Now that we are no longer travelling 10 kilometres 
to look for water, I have time to do some work in the home. It actually reduced the burden on 
us women” (Interview: Memoh; 09/09/2013). Therefore, the drilling of boreholes has reduced 
the time women spent searching for the scarce resource. WCoZ suggests that women spent 
―an estimated 60% of their time and daily energy collecting water, walking long distances 
and following queues‖ (NewsDay, December 4, 2013). Figure 4.3 shows one of the boreholes 




Figure 4.3: Women fetching water at a borehole drilled in Nyathi Village, Zvishavane district 
More than just solving their water woes for domestic use, the drilling of boreholes has also 
helped those near these boreholes to do small-scale gardening where they grow green 
vegetables which they sometimes sell to supplement household income. On this, one of the 
interviewees said; “Now we are even able to do vegetable gardening, I can sell the 
vegetables and get money to buy other household necessities such as sugar or soap” 
(Interview: Tendai; 03/09/2013).  
Moreover, small-scale gardening improves food security at household level as they get the 





Figure 4.4: An adult woman in her small garden near the borehole in Nyathi Village 
Loss of agricultural land 
Yirenkyi (2008) argues that the biggest impact of mining is on land and this translates into 
economic loss or livelihood loss due to the encroachment of mining activities on agricultural 
and grazing land. For people in Zvishavane, the expansion of mining activities in the rural 
areas is becoming more of a liability in as far as rural livelihood is concerned. The 
respondents raised concern with the effect of mining activities on grazing land and on 
livestock as a source of livelihood. James, an adult male community member said;  
“You see that side, all that area used to be our grazing land, but now it’s only heaps of 
sand and stone with large pits lying open. We are slowly losing our grazing land and 
we will never get it back and that affects our livelihood. We do not have any other 
economic activities here except keeping our livestock; we don’t receive enough rains so 
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crop cultivation is difficult. So you see, mining is good for the country’s economy, but 
what about us here who are affected, it’s not helping us at all” (James; 04/09/2013).  
Negi (2000) contends that the expansion of mining activities in rural areas, though it has 
strengthened the powers of traditional leaders in forging mining-local community relations as 
is the case in South Africa‘s platinum belt (Mnwana, 2011; Manson, 2013), it has left chiefs 
with limited power over the use of land in their localities. The loss of grazing land in 
Zvishavane as highlighted in the above response shows that chiefs are now losing their power 
over land use in rural areas. Yirenkyi (2008) also argues that post operational impacts are 
more prominent when reclamation is not carried out properly, and the response above shows 
that lack of reclamation eats up grazing land thus affecting people‘s livelihoods, which is 
largely dependent on agriculture.  
In terms of responding to loss of livelihood due to the encroachment of mining activities on 
people‘s agricultural and grazing land, the ZCSOT has done nothing. Mawowa (2013) 
contends that people in resource-rich areas bear the cost of environmental degradation due to 
mining activities. Hence, CSOTs in Zimbabwe need to put on their agenda issues concerning 
environmental protection and sustainability of rural livelihoods which largely depend on land. 
With regards to loss of agricultural land, the traditional leader said;  
“At the moment we haven’t done anything but plans are in place for us to start 
irrigation so that those people who lost their land to mining activities should be able to 
do their agriculture. Of course they have been compensated and have been given other 
pieces of land, but you know as people, that feeling of loss might be still in them. So 
what we are saying is we will start irrigation and everyone should benefit so that we 
sustain people’s livelihoods (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013).   
The expansion of mining activities in Zvishavane encroached on people‘s rights to land 
and has resulted in the loss of land as a source of livelihood. The presence of mining 
activities as well as the resultant establishment of CSOTs is believed to be able to benefit 
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all the people in resource-rich communities. This stems from the assumption in some 
quarters in the discourse of community development that ‗community‘ is homogeneous in 
composition and harmonious in social relations (Jeppe, 1985 and Craig and Mayo, 1995). 
This therefore suggests that all the people in this homogenous entity are bound to benefit 
from community development initiatives. However, Burkey (1993) contends that the 
‗harmony model‘ of community in community development needs to be deconstructed 
because people are affected differently. In this case, the loss of cultivation land and 
grazing land has more detrimental effects on those who rely on land as a source of 
livelihood; these are the people with no alternative sources of household income. In 
essence, empowerment through the establishment of the CSOT becomes disempowerment 
for others who rely on land as a source of livelihood. For example, the discovery of 
diamonds in Marange resulted in the movement of more than four hundred families off 
their land to another resettlement area. But the establishment of the Marange-Zimunya 
Community Share Ownership Trust, CNRG observes, is not benefiting them at all (The 
Financial Gazette, October 13, 2013). To this end, I suggest that ZCSOT, now as a 
shareholder in some mining companies operating in Zvishavane, should represent the 
interests of those who lost their land as a source of livelihood due to expansion of mining 
activities and ensure that their livelihood is sustained. 
Conclusion 
The social and economic conditions that prevailed in Zvishavane‘s rural communities before 
the establishment of the ZCSOT clearly indicated that the district was experiencing the 
resource curse. This is so because the presence of extractive industrial activities failed to 
solve the challenges that the communities were facing. The failure of mineral resource 
extraction to stimulate the social and economic transformation of Zvishavane‘s rural areas 
indicates the inadequacies that are inherent in liberal market-based development purposes, in 
this case CSR. The mining companies had failed to effectively address some of the 
challenges faced by people in Zvishavane, most of which fall within their obligations under 
the principles of CSR. However, the establishment of the ZCSOT has brought some relief on 
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the rural people in Zvishavane as it has begun implementing a number aimed at addressing 
some of the challenges experienced in Zvishavane, something which the mining companies 
or even government failed to do for years. The Trust has constructed new structures in 
schools and rural clinics; it has drilled boreholes and is offering short-term employment to the 
locals. In this way, the ZCSOT which was conceived from the indigenisation policy is 
providing a counterbalance to notions of the resource curse. It is proving that with people-
centred policies, natural resource wealth can be used for social and economic transformation 
of people in resource-rich communities. Again, the achievements of the ZCSOT in 
Zvishavane expose the shortfalls of market-based, expert-led development to filter the 
benefits from resource extraction to the communities harbouring the resources. Therefore, a 
look into what the ZCSOT was able to achieve in its responses to the social and economic 
challenges being faced by people in Zvishavane District shows the gains of promoting 













CHAPTER FIVE: THE PRACTICALITY OF „COMMUNITY‟ OWNERSHIP, 
PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction   
The previous chapter focused on the social and economic challenges being faced by people 
living in Zvishavane‘s rural communities and examined the ways in which the ZCSOT is 
responding to mitigate those challenges. Now this chapter analyses the ZCSOT in operation 
in order to answer the questions on the practicality of ‗community‘ ownership, broad-based 
participation and ‗community‘ empowerment, which are the objectives of the indigenisation 
policy. The main argument here is that effective community development should be anchored 
on the concepts of ‗community‘ ownership, participation and empowerment. However, it is 
essential to problematise and unpack the notion of ‗community‘ in order for community 
development to realise its full potential. As such, the chapter investigates the ways in which 
the ZCSOT engages with the beneficiaries, how ordinary community members participate as 
a community in the operation of the ZCSOT. I will agree with Crehan‘s (1997) 
conceptualisation of rural areas as ‗fractured communities‘, White‘s (1996) view of 
participation as a political phenomenon as well as other authors who focus on the capture of 
community development by elites.  
The indigenisation and economic empowerment policy in Zimbabwe seeks to empower 
previously economically deprived Zimbabweans, the majority of whom reside in the rural 
areas. The policy states that the previously economically deprived majority gets empowered 
through facilitating and stimulating their participation in the economic development of the 
country so that they are able to partake in enjoying the benefits of economic growth. And in 
resource-rich areas, CSOTs are the mechanism through which this objective can be realised. 
More importantly, CSOTs are established in order to ensure that resource-rich communities 
are able to ―freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources… in the exclusive interest of 
the people,‖ a right guaranteed them by the African Charter (African Charter on Human and 
People‘s Rights, 1981; NIEEB, 2013:2). Community share ownership trusts are intended to 
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promote ‗community‘ ownership, by the community in question, of the shares ceded to the 
Trust by qualifying businesses operating in that community.  
Basically, the expectation is that natural resource availability should play an integral role in 
uplifting and improving the living conditions of people in resource endowed areas. Again, 
CSOTs should be instrumental in stimulating a sense of ownership among such people, 
promote their participation in finding solutions to the socio-economic challenges bedevilling 
them, thereby enabling them to derive benefits through such participation. But how this is 
achieved is crucial. This analysis focuses on whether the ZCSOT foster a sense of community 
ownership of the natural resource wealth as well as promote the empowerment of local 
communities as is the goal of the indigenisation policy. I will explore the community‘s 
knowledge of the ZCSOT because this determines how they will participate; I will also 
examine the politicisation of the CSOT, the role of traditional leaders in community 
development and the participation of ordinary community members in the Trust. 
Community knowledge about the ZCSOT 
In trying to investigate the level to which people in Zvishavane consider themselves 
empowered through the establishment of the ZCSOT, I found it worthwhile to examine their 
knowledge concerning the ZCSOT. I realised that knowledge about the CSOT is essential for 
people to embrace the objectives of indigenisation and economic empowerment. This 
understanding is crucial in mobilising people‘s participation in the activities of the CSOT. 
Minister Francis Nhema
6
 raised the same opinion when he stressed that the vision of the 
indigenisation programme is to ensure that everyone has access to information that leads 
them to be empowered in order for the policy to realise its goals (The Sunday Mail, October 
6, 2013). This vision is in line with the UNESCO-developed concept of ―Knowledge 
Societies‖, which refers to societies in which people have the capabilities not just to acquire 
information but also to transform it into knowledge and understanding, which then empowers 
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them to enhance their livelihoods and contribute to the social and economic development of 
their societies (UNESCO, 2005). In this regard, the materiality of the transformative capacity 
of the indigenisation policy in general and CSOTs in particular can only be realised if the 
intended beneficiaries are well informed. Emphasis need to be put on ‗community‘ ownership 
of mineral resources (through the CSOT) and ‗broad-based‘ participation in the activities of 
the CSOT.  
While the new minister of indigenisation acknowledged the significance of access to 
information as integral for the empowerment of the people, the study indicated that people in 
Zvishavane are not as well informed as they should be about the ZCSOT. It emerged that 
community members, besides knowing about the existence of the ZCSOT and the various 
projects it is doing around Zvishavane, most do not know anything about the Trust as shown 
in this response; ―I came to know about the Trust when it started building us the classroom 
block at the primary school… About how it started, umm, I’m not sure… The people 
responsible, I heard it’s the chief, but I don’t know who exactly is responsible” (Interview: 
Rudo; 02/09/2013). Another respondent from the community when asked why the ZCSOT 
was established, she professed ignorance saying; “Umm, I don’t know” (Interview: Memoh; 
09/09/2013). This shows that the ZCSOT was not publicised properly.  
Again, where ordinary community members appear to know about the ZCSOT, the 
information they have is distorted and often incorrect as shown in this response concerning 
how the ZCSOT started;  
“I heard that our chiefs went to the mines and they asked them to give money to the 
Trust so that the Trust can start doing different projects like what it is doing, building 
schools and drilling boreholes. I heard they were given US$10 million from Mimosa” 
(Interview: Katherine; 02/09/2013).  
Though the respondent was correct that the money that came from the mines was US$10 
million, what is inaccurate is that the chiefs were the ones who went to the mining companies 
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and demanded the money. Most people are not aware of the indigenisation policy and the fact 
that the ZCSOT came as a result of this government programme. Knowledge with regards to 
how the CSOT was established is vital, especially considering that it was conceived from the 
indigenisation and empowerment policy. This forms the basis upon which people can 
comprehend government‘s indigenisation and economic empowerment programme. As a 
result, lack of knowledge about the basic aspects of the indigenisation programme and the 
CSOT inhibit the full realisation of the objectives of empowerment as people are not able to 
fully participate.  
A number of respondents take the ZCSOT as a “programme for chiefs” (Interview: Rudo; 
02/0302013) or as having been “formed by the chiefs” (Interview: Memoh; 09/09/2013). I 
became interested in investigating why the people put the chiefs at the helm of the ZCSOT, 
seeing them as the ones who facilitated the establishment of the CSOT. It might be that this 
misinformation was intended to increase the power and control of chiefs over their people. 
Viewing chiefs as instrumental in the establishment of the ZCSOT degenerates into 
paternalism in which chiefs are seen as doing everything for their people. Once the ZCSOT is 
seen as a programme for chiefs, the goals of promoting broad-based participation in resource 
ownership as well as community empowerment are destroyed. This makes the ZCSOT 
susceptible to ‗elite capture‘ which refers to manipulation by powerful local elites (Platteau 
and Gaspart, 2003; Wong, 2010; Street, 2012). And in this case, the misrepresentation of the 
ZCSOT to the people is an illustration of elite capture by chiefs who seek to increase their 
political control over their subjects.    
Mnwana and Akpan (2009) argue that the process of participatory development is marred by 
information gaps where accurate information is withheld from certain groups. They posit that 
this information gap exists between active and passive participants. Likewise, there are some 
people I interviewed who were better informed about the ZCSOT as the following respondent 
aptly explains the indigenisation policy;  
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It is a programme that was started by government to ensure that the communities in 
which mining activities are done can get 10 per cent of the shares in those companies 
so that the community can use that money to develop itself and here, it is through the 
Zvishavane Community Trust. They use that money to do different projects like what 
they are doing, building schools, clinics and drilling boreholes (Interview: Rumbidzai; 
03/09/2013). 
Another respondent articulated on the objectives of the ZCSOT saying: 
The main objective is to promote the development of the communities in which minerals 
are being mined so that at least we have something to show for the resources we have. 
As you know Zvishavane has a lot of minerals, so we have to benefit from those 
minerals. It won’t make sense to have such mineral wealth but living in poverty. The 
minerals should be used to solve some of the challenges we are facing here; we have 
critical water shortages, our health delivery system is poor, our school buildings are 
old. We need to find solutions to all these challenges; that is why we were given a 10 
per cent share stake in Mimosa (Interview: James; 04/09/2013). 
The above responses by James and Rumbidzai indicate that they are well informed about the 
ZCSOT. However, what is striking between the two respondents is that both have a better 
social standing in their respective villages and are close to the people with influence. 
Rumbidzai is a wife to a village headman and James is a village secretary in another village. 
As such, they are in a better position to get information concerning the ZCSOT from their 
village headmen who attend meetings at the chief‘s court. At these meetings, some issues 
concerning the ZCSOT are discussed. Ordinary community members on the other end are not 
as well informed as are certain privileged members of society, thus exposing the knowledge 
gap. The existence of the knowledge gap testifies to the actuality of the ‗fractured 
community‘ (Crehan, 1997) which privileges certain community members to access 
information on empowerment, thus impeding the full participation and ultimate 
empowerment of ordinary community members. 
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Considering the centrality of access to information and knowledge to people‘s empowerment 
as highlighted by the UNESCO (2005) report, lack of information among community 
members regarding the ZCSOT impedes the goal of empowerment and ultimately affects the 
process of community development. This is so because people cannot fully participate in the 
activities of the ZCSOT without being knowledgeable of why they participate and how they 
should participate. People can only participate when they are aware of their role as 
indigenous citizens. As will be shown later in this chapter, the study found out that levels of 
participation by ordinary community members in the activities of the ZCSOT are very 
negligible, instead crucial decisions are made by those with power, away from the non-elites 
as noted by Arnstein (1969) in many participatory approaches to development. This is mainly 
because people are not knowledgeable about how they should get empowered through the 
ZCSOT, they are not aware of their role in the activities of the Trust. That is why decision 
making in the ZCSOT is highly centralised around chiefs and paternalistic as is the case in 
the Mhondoro-Ngezi Community Share Ownership Trust Mawowa (Mawowa, 2013). 
However, the traditional leader was defensive on this seeming knowledge gap in Zvishavane. 
Asked why some of the respondents professed ignorance with regards to the ZCSOT, he said; 
“We conducted outreach campaigns throughout the whole district… We held the 
meetings at every ward centre. Maybe, as you know the MDC was discrediting CSOTs, 
it might be the case that some of their members were not attending these meetings, so 
they don’t know about the Trust or they just don’t want to appreciate that it’s working” 
(Interview: Mr Mutongi, 04/09/2013).  
Also, another key informant responding to why ordinary community members appear to be 
uninformed about the ZCSOT said; “I don’t know, maybe they are those people who were not 
attending the community outreach meetings we held around the district” (Mr Tsungai; 
05/09/2013). Therefore we can argue that political despondency, as shown in the above 
response by the traditional leader, especially among those people who supported other 
political parties opposed to ZANU-PF, discouraged them from attending the meetings held 
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because for them they were just political rallies. What is important to note is that the 
association of the ZCSOT with politics prevented some community members from getting 
enough knowledge about the indigenisation policy in general and the ZCSOT in particular. I 
discuss the politicisation of the ZCSOT in detail below. 
Political manipulation of the indigenisation process 
Zhou and Zvoushe (2012) argue that state interventionism in Zimbabwe‘s third decade after 
independence was fundamentally driven by political motives, it ―had a partisan, 
temperamental, exclusionary, hurried, and short-term bent‖ (p 212). The indigenisation policy 
involves excessive state intervention in the economy, with government making it mandatory 
for all foreign-owned enterprises to cede 51 per cent of their shares to locals, failure of which 
is threatened by company take over by the state as said by Saviour Kasukuwere
7; ―If you do 
not want to comply, we will take over, simple and straightforward‖ (The Herald, December 
13, 2011). The study found out that CSOSs in Zimbabwe were highly politicised. Allegations 
were rife from other political parties that ZANU-PF was manipulating CSOSs as a 
campaigning tool for the July 31, 2013 elections, and the MDC dismissed CSOTs as ―nothing 
but another ploy to hoodwink voters ahead of elections‖ (Bulawayo 24, February 6, 2013).  
To confirm that ZANU-PF manipulated CSOTs, the study found out that much of the 
publicity of the ZCSOT was done during ZANU-PF political rallies. Rudo said they were told 
about the ZCSOT at “a political meeting” for ZANU-PF (Interview: Rudo; 02/09/2013). 
Another respondent concurred saying; “We were at a political rally. That’s where we told 
that there is a Trust and Mimosa gave US$10 million to the Trust, but we thought that it is 
just politics” (Interview: Peter; 09/09/2013). ZANU-PF used the indigenisation policy as an 
integral component of its election manifesto. The association of the ZCSOT with a certain 
political party was thus an obstacle to the effective dissemination of information about the 
Trust to the communities. Some people would not attend the so-called community meetings 
                                                          
7
 Saviour Kasukuwere is a former Minister of Youth Indigenisation, Development and Economic Empowerment 
during the time of the Government of National Unity from 2008 to 2013. He said these words at the launch of 
the ZCSOT when Mimosa Mining Company had complied with the minimum regulations of indigenisation. 
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which later turned out to be political meetings for ZANU-PF. Others would just not listen to 
what was said about the ZCSOT because they regarded it as cheap politicking. This shows 
the manipulation of populist policies for political reasons (Asutay, 2010; Street, 2012) and 
the capture of participatory development and empowerment programmes by political elites 
(Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Mohan and Stokke, 2000).   
Chiefs were the ones responsible for publicising the ZCSOT to their people during most of 
these meetings. On this, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2012) bemoaned the involvement 
of chiefs regarding it as an obstacle to effective implementation of the indigenisation policy 
given the political polarity in many rural areas and the fact that most traditional leaders in 
Zimbabwe are allegedly partisan in favour of ZANU-PF. Felly said, “We were at a rally at 
the ward centre and the chief told us about the Trust. He said Mimosa has given US$10 
million to the Trust and that they (referring to chiefs) will use the money for different projects 
across Zvishavane” (Interview: Felly; 07/09/2013). The motive for publicising the ZCSOT at 
political rallies was thus far from promoting genuine economic emancipation of the rural 
communities. Rather, it was to gain political mileage on the part of ZANU-PF, and political 
control over the people on the part of chiefs. This opinion is supported by Makumbe (2010) 
who alleges that traditional leaders in Zimbabwe are loyal to ZANU-PF; hence they can do 
anything to ensure that ZANU PF remains in power.  
In the above response, the pronoun “they” refers to chiefs as the ones who would use the 
money in the Trust to do different projects in their respective communities. This shows that 
chiefs, rather than the community, are at the centre of all the activities of the ZCSOT. This 
supports White‘s (1996) contention that participatory development has the potential to 
entrench and reproduce existing relations of domination. Seeing chiefs as responsible for the 
activities of the Trust produces paternalistic relations between chiefs and the community, thus 
preventing effective community participation.  
Political manipulation of the ZCSOT has proved to be a barrier for community members to 
embrace the empowerment programme as they view it more as a political gimmick rather 
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than a genuine concern for the empowerment of the people. The study has revealed that the 
politicisation of the ZCSOT gave little motivation for the people to concern themselves with 
the CSOT, which to some was just “one such way by politicians to win our votes” 
(Interview: Peter; 09/09/2013). As a result, some people became sceptical of the promises of 
indigenisation and empowerment as one respondent aptly puts it;  
“When the chiefs were talking about the ZCSOT at the political rallies, we just thought 
it as their politics of campaigning for ZANU-PF, we have heard of such things before 
during election time but nothing was fulfilled. So everyone did not take them 
seriously…” (Interview: Maria; 03/09/2013).  
The politicisation of the ZCSOT therefore derails the goal of indigenising resource ownership 
and empowering local communities, thus confirming Robertson‘s (2012) contention that the 
political manipulation of the indigenisation programme makes its economic contribution 
marginal and sceptical. Its association with politics gives little motivation for other 
community members to participate in community meetings as shown in the following 
response; “I did not go there (to the needs assessment meeting). Everyone knew that it was 
politics, they just wanted to find a way to lure us to the rally so that we would vote for them 
come elections” (Interview: Jessica; 06/09/2013). Therefore, politicisation of the ZCSOT 
kills the spirit of participation among community members which is the mainstay of the 
process of community development (Jeppe, 1985; Burkey, 1993; Bridger and Luloff, 1999; 
Ife and Toseriero, 2006; Ledwith, 2011). Failure to promote the participation of people due to 
politicisation thus destroys the whole process of community development because 
community development rests upon popular participation. And absence of participation 
means that there is no empowerment of the people. 
The demotivation of people to participate in the few meetings that were held in the name of 
the ZCSOT due to its association with politics clearly demystifies the ‗harmony model‘ of 
community which is presupposed in some quarters of community development. Burkey 
(1993) states that rural communities are far from homogenous, and as noted by Crehan 
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(1997:10) this shows that rural areas are ―fractured communities‖ differentiated , in this 
regard, on the grounds of political affiliation. Therefore, the case of Zvishavane shows that 
collapsing rural communities as homogenous entities results in the [self]-exclusion of others 
from the process of community development. 
Interestingly, the politicisation of the ZCSOT was justified on grounds that ZANU-PF‘s 
policies are populist and people oriented unlike the MDC who is accused of championing 
elitist neoliberal policies. In support of this, the traditional leader said;  
“ZANU PF associates itself with the people, its policies are people-centred and they 
have the plight of the people at heart, so there is no problem of associating the 
indigenisation policy or this CSOT with ZANU-PF because that is a political reality. 
The Trust was born out of ZANU-PF’s people-centred policy” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 
04/09/2013).  
However, Asutay (2010) argues that it is a commonplace practice that people first, people-
centred and populist policies only come during periods of political campaigning. As such, 
they are fraught with deceptive political and economic promises that will never be realised 
after the election. On this, critics argue that Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation programme is 
radically driven by political motives, thus making its economic objectivity highly debatable 
and doubtful (Robertson, 2012; Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). This makes the promises of 
empowerment and community development less achievable. In line with this, one respondent 
lamented the reality of community share ownership schemes as a people-centred blueprint 
that promotes the ‗broad-based‘ participation of community members as outlined in the 
indigenisation policy documents. He said;  
“There is no meaningful participation by the people, I don’t remember any day where a 
meeting was held exclusively to ask us about what we want. They (chiefs) plan 
everything on their own, maybe the village headmen take part, I don’t know, but as for 
us the people, we just see the projects when they are being done, how they planned 
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them, we don’t know. We are only called when they are commissioning the finished 
product to us, that’s when the chief will say we did this for you” (Interview: Tawanda; 
09/09/2013).  
When chiefs say “…we did this for you”, as the above respondent puts it, it creates relations 
of paternalism between the chief and his people. It presents chiefs as leaders who are able to 
provide everything for their subjects. In the end, political motives stifle the objectives of 
promoting broad-based participation.  
Nevertheless, the study has shown that the chiefs are attempting to depoliticise the ZCSOT, 
therefore ascertaining the economic credence of the indigenisation policy. One community 
respondent said;  
“Now, the chief always stresses that the Trust, though it is a product of ZANU-PF’s 
policies, it is not for ZANU-PF, it is for us. That’s why it’s called Zvishavane 
Community Share Ownership Trust. It is for the people of Zvishavane, and with the 
work it is doing in Zvishavane, we can see it now” (Interview: Maria; 03/09/2013).  
The traditional leader also said they have tried to depoliticise the CSOT even during the 
campaigning period for elections so that no politician takes advantage of the Trust; 
“…we said no, politicians should not talk about the Trust because if they campaign 
using it there will be problems let’s say if we fail to deliver what the politician said we 
will do as a Trust. The MP will say something different from what we as trustees are 
doing. The MP just because he wants to win the votes might tell the people that the 
chief will do this and that for you so that he can win the election. So we said no, not 
everyone should talk about the Community Share Ownership Trust because there will 
be contradictions. So we said this programme is for the chief because we were afraid 
that politicians will present it differently to meet their own political goals” (Interview: 
Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013). 
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However, the fact that traditional chiefs are the ones mandated to preach the gospel of 
indigenisation at various meetings, even campaigning rallies defeats all efforts to depoliticise 
the indigenisation programme. Actually, it affirms Rangan and Gilmartin‘s (2002) assertion 
that traditional authorities can be used by political elites to maintain ‗indirect rule‘ over the 
rural majority, a system described by Mamdani (1996) as ‗decentralised despotism.‘ On a 
similar note, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (2012) bemoans the involvement of chiefs 
highlighting that it weakens the programme‘s transparency given the alleged partisanship of 
most traditional leaders in favour of ZANU-PF. In essence, the association of the ZCSOT 
with partisan politics is a disincentive to the full realisation of the goal of empowerment of 
rural communities. 
Traditional authority: custodianship or paternalism in community development 
The institution of traditional leaders, which comprise chiefs and village headmen, has shown 
its resilience over the years and is integral in rural community administration in Zimbabwe 
and Africa as a whole (Osaghae, 1987; Keulder, 2000; Makumbe, 2010). The literature has 
shown the evolutionary adaptation of this institution from pre-colonial times through the 
colonial up to the post-colonial period. Nonetheless, during all these phases, the role of 
traditional leaders, especially chiefs was maintained. Mamdani (1996) notes that during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods, the institution of traditional authority was incorporated as 
an extension of the modern state‘s controlling hand over rural people, and he refers to this as 
‗decentralised despotism‘. Bourdillon (1976:131) also notes that the traditional role of the 
chief is an extension of the ideal patriarchal system where the chief is seen as ―the senior 
member of the dominant clan of chiefdom.‖ The chief‘s position as the senior member of the 
clan accords him the traditional title of ‗father‘ to his people and he sees them as his children 
(Ibid). In light of this, it is important to analyse the role of traditional leaders, especially 
chiefs, who rotate the chairmanship position in the ZCSOTs. How does this impact on 
people‘s participation in as well as benefiting from the ZCSOT?  
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This study, in agreement with Crehan‘s (1997) concept of fractured communities, found that 
the rural communities in Zvishavane are fragmented on the basis of power and influence, thus 
disqualifying the ‗harmony model‘ of rural communities purported by other proponents of 
community development (Jeppe, 1985; Craig and Mayo, 1995). From the survey, chiefs were 
classified as the ones who have the greatest power and influence on all issues to do with the 
ZCSOT. From the survey, 95.9% of the respondents acknowledged the presence of some 
powerful people in their communities who have greater influence over the ZCSOT. Only 
4.1% said the contrary, implying that everyone has equal influence with regards to the 
ZCSOT which I found to be very far from reality. The people who were mentioned as being 
powerful were chiefs and sometimes politicians. This therefore shows that Zvishavane is not 
a homogenous community in terms of power and influence with regards to the ZCSOT.  
Confirming this, one respondent said, “At community level, the chief and his headmen have 
the greatest power. The chief plans everything with the village heads at the chief’s court” 
(Interview: Maria; 03/09/2013). Women and the youth rarely take part in meetings held at the 
chief‘s court as Rudo‘s response reveals;  
“Me, a woman like me, I don’t go to the chief’s court, what will I be doing? It is the 
village headmen who go there” (Interview: Rudo; 02/03/2013).  
Ironically, women and the youth do not take part in the meetings with the chief where the 
activities of the Trust are planned yet they are the ones who constitute the majority of people 
in Zvishavane's rural communities. The 2012 census data shows that women in Zvishavane‘ 
rural communities constitute the majority of the population at 52% while men constitute 48% 
(ZimStat, 2013). Besides women being the majority of the population, which on its on 
warrants women to be represented in such meetings, the indigenisation policy target women 
and youth as the main targets of empowerment. Then this raises questions about how they can 
be empowered when they are not represented in meetings about the ZCSOT. The non-
representation of women in these meetings sums up Bourdillon‘s (1976) observation that the 
institution of traditional authority is an extension of the patriarchal system. Patriarchy is 
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notorious for suppressing women‘s rights (Rangan and Gilmartin, 2002)), and this leaves the 
ZCSOT wanting in as far as the empowerment of women is concerned. Therefore, the 
concentration of power and influence in the social segment of traditional leaders stifle the 
participation of women and the youth, thus compromising their chances of benefiting from 
projects implemented by the Trust.  
I found it essential to explore people‘s opinion about the influence traditional leaders have in 
the ZCSOT. Figure 5.1 below indicates people‘s opinion with regards to the influence of 
traditional leaders in the ZCSOT.  
 
 Figure 5.1: Is the influence of traditional leaders positive or negative? 
From Figure 5.1 above, a slightly greater proportion of respondents, 44.9%, sees as negative 
the influence of traditional leaders in planning the activities of the ZCSOT compared to 
42.9% who regard it as positive. In the end, people hold different opinions on the influence of 
traditional leaders in the ZCSOT, but the fact that a greater proportion of respondents regard 
it as negative shows that many people might be feeling excluded. They see that their interests 
are not adequately represented, thus having a counter effect on the goal of empowerment. 

























“The role of traditional leaders is very important. We are doing a great job; we 
represent the interests of all our people. For example, if we built a school or a 
borehole, everyone will benefit whether they are men or women” (Interview: Mr 
Mutongi; 04/09/2013). 
The chief‘s response shows that they represent the interests of every community citizen. I 
analyse this role of chiefs below.  
Traditional leaders as custodians and representatives of the people 
The constitution of Zimbabwe recognises the socio-political administration of rural areas 
under traditional authority and states that traditional leaders should perform the ―traditional 
functions‖ of a traditional leader (Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20), 2013). 
The constitution does not state the traditional functions of a traditional leader, however, it 
gives them the constitutional mandate to ―facilitate development‖ in their areas of jurisdiction 
(Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 20, Chapter 15, Section 282 (c), 2013). By 
giving traditional leaders the role to facilitate development, the constitution confers in them 
some form of political capital that gives them the political mandate to bring development into 
the communities they lead. Similarly, the indigenisation policy recognises the constitutional 
mandate of traditional leaders to facilitate development, thus they are made chairpersons of 
CSOTs. This clearly shows that both the constitution and the IEE policy somehow subscribe 
to the dictates of top-down approaches to development which thus militates against the full 
participation of ordinary community members in the process of community development 
because the mandate to facilitate development is vested in the institution of traditional chiefs. 
Traditionally, the chief is the guardian of the life of his people, and ―life comes from the land 
of which the chief is the owner‖ (Bourdillon, 1976:131). Also, Crehan (1997) notes that 
chiefs represent the apex of kinship where they represent the widest net of authority, and by 
this, are considered as fathers by their subjects. As owners of the land and as fathers, chiefs 
have the responsibility to ensure the prosperity of their people (Bourdillon, 1982). To this 
end, Negi (2000) posits that chiefs have the moral obligation as custodians and fathers to their 
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people to provide for their people, hence are seen as representatives of the communities they 
lead. In agreement with this, the traditional leader said;  
“Government came with this programme, and knowing that chiefs are the owners of the 
land and everything in it, there was no way they could leave us out. A chief is like a 
father to his people so the people always look up to the chief in times of need and the 
chief as the father should be able to provide for the needs of his children. Like now they 
said we need schools, we need hospitals, we need water; through the Trust, chiefs are 
able to do that. We go to the Trust knowing the needs of our people, we present them 
and the Trust will do exactly what we ask” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
The foregoing sentiments show that the pivotal role chiefs‘ play in facilitating development 
in their areas has restored their traditional responsibilities of ensuring the prosperity of their 
people, thus reanimating the status and respect traditional leaders used to have. To this end, 
the revival of traditional leaders‘ status and role as custodians of the people is of great 
importance for the development of the Zvishavane rural communities as these leaders are, as 
claimed by the traditional leader in the above response, able to raise matters of local concern 
to the ZCSOT where they are the sole representatives of the beneficiary communities. 
However, this might result in the entrenchment of relations of domination between the chief 
and his people; hence there is need for equal participation so that through participation, 
community members are able to challenge any tendencies of domination (White, 1996).  
Furthermore, the responsibility of traditional leaders as ‗father‘ to their people makes them 
integral players in the process of community development. Community development is 
people-centred and people-driven; it involves finding solutions to people‘s problems through 
promoting their participation. As such, by being father figures to their people, traditional 
leaders become the very ―embodiment‖ of rural communities (Negi, 2000:229). As the 
embodiment of the rural societies, the chiefs are able to represent the interests of their people, 
thereby championing social and economic transformation of their areas. In support of this 
role of chiefs, a key informant said;  
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“Chiefs have an important role; they initiate all the programmes being undertaken by 
the Trust in the interest of their people. They have that traditional role as custodians of 
the people, so basing on that, the minerals are being mined in their areas so we don’t 
need to exclude them. Again they live with the people, so they have to be at the 
forefront in pushing the priority needs of their people, they are the ones who know the 
needs of their people” (Interview: Mrs Chepiri; 05/09/2013).  
The involvement of chiefs as representatives and custodians of the people is seen as central in 
promoting development that is context specific because chiefs, as part of the community, are 
aware of the social and economic needs of their people. This is in contrast with expert-led 
development which is promoted by outsiders who do not have direct experiences of the 
conditions affecting the people (Uphoff, 1985). However, in the case of Zvishavane, the 
degree to which all the people‘s interests are represented is still to be seen as discussed 
earlier. The fact that some people still express discontent over the representativeness of chiefs 
opposes the above sentiments. It clearly shows the shortfalls of collapsing rural communities 
as homogenous entities that have the same interests represented by the chief.  
The involvement of chiefs is justified as one way of promoting accountability in the process 
of community development in Zvishavane. Chiefs are seen as more accountable to their 
communities than any other development practitioners. On this, the traditional leader said;  
The people tell the chief what they need to be done for them, for example chief we need 
a school; we need a borehole here or a clinic. The chief knows his area, and if the 
people ask for something, he knows that for sure this is a real need. What they say they 
want is what they will receive from the Trust. The chief is aware of the real challenges 
faced by his people and is able to ensure that the people receive what they have asked 
for. If he fails, the people will be asking him, where is our borehole, where is our 
school. Again this is different with government officials who hardly meet with the 




The response above shows that traditional leaders have the moral obligation to be 
accountable to their people. Again, the close proximity of chiefs and their people makes 
accountability more realisable than as is the case with elected national and local government 
officials. This supports Osaghae‘s (1987) argument that chieftaincy conceive the source and 
lifeblood of power as lying in the collective good of all members of society. Consequently, 
this provides a strong philosophical basis for establishing accountability in the governance 
and administration of communities under traditional authority. This is also in line with 
Crehan‘s (1997) argument that the principle of traditional authority in a rural political 
economy is derived from appealing to the imagined obligations of kinship. As such, the 
involvement of chiefs in the ZCSOT is aimed to promote accountability.  
By being more accountable, chiefs are able to promote development that directly answers to 
the needs of the people as echoed by Mr Mutongi‘s sentiments above. A community member 
also concurs on this saying;  
“At first when the chief addressed us, we just thought it is politics since it was 
campaigning time, we said we have heard such promises before that were never 
fulfilled. We never took the chief seriously when he said the Trust will give us what we 
requested, but to our surprise, the borehole came; now they are electrifying the clinic 
at Ingome. The way chiefs are working with the Trust is different from politicians, the 
chief makes sure that his people receive what they have requested” (Interview:  Maria; 
03/09/2013). 
Basically, the operation of the ZCSOT recognises the traditional roles of chiefs in 
development, the responsibility which is also recognised in Zimbabwe‘s constitution. Chiefs 
are the traditional owners or custodians of land and land is believed to be the source of life. 
As owners of the land, chiefs should ensure the prosperity of their people, especially 
prosperity from the fruits of the land, hence their constitutional responsibility to administer 
the distribution of communal land. Again, the fact that traditional authority in general is 
kinship based, with the chief representing the pinnacle of kinship, the chief is regarded by his 
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people as ‗father‘. As such, chiefs are believed to have the interests of their people at heart, 
thus they are seen to be representing their people and raise matters of local concern in the 
ZCSOT. This is how chiefs are able to bring development that directly addresses the concerns 
of their people, and their traditional roles and responsibilities make them more accountable 
and less corrupt.  
However, as shown in the survey data in Figure 5.2 that some respondents expressed 
discontent in the involvement of chiefs seeing it as negative, the role of chiefs thus need to be 
critically analysed. I now turn to the flip-side of traditional authority in which I analyse how 
their involvement in the ZCSOT degenerates into and entrenches relations of domination, 
thus negatively impacting on the process of empowerment. 
Paternalism, domination and traditional authority as political capital 
The involvement of traditional authority in the activities of the ZCSOT was also seen as an 
impediment to the realisation of empowerment and social and economic transformation of 
rural areas in Zvishavane. According to Cary (1970) the process of community development 
should give local communities greater control over social and economic conditions affecting 
their lives. Community development should not be one way of entrenching relations of 
domination in society. To this end, Ledwith (2011:32) asserts that it should involve ―critical 
insight into the way that power in society favours the already privileged, and the way that 
forces of disempowerment perpetuate these inequalities.‖ It should promote the 
empowerment of traditionally deprived social groups, and not empower certain groups of 
people within the ‗fractured community‘. This study established that the involvement of 
chiefs in the ZCSOT, though significant as shown above, can also work against the principles 
of community development.  
A critical look into the execution of the traditional roles by chiefs in the operation of the 
ZCSOT shows that it repeatedly degenerates into paternalism and domination of the people 
by the chiefs. Paternalism defeats the virtues of community development which is anchored 
on the participation of community members in the processes of development. Asked if 
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community members play any significant role in the projects they receive under the ZCSOT, 
a community member said;  
“No it is the chief who does everything. He would just come to us and say I was in a 
meeting in Zvishavane, this is what we planned, and you will receive a classroom block 
and a borehole. We don’t ask why a classroom block instead of some other thing, it’s 
better to receive something than nothing at all” (Interview: Katherine; 02/09/2013). 
This indicates that chiefs are the ones who do everything, they are the epitome of the rural 
communities they lead in the ZCSOT, hence the need of not having other representatives of 
the communities in the Board of Trustees in the ZCSOT. The people then do not play any 
significant role in the activities of the ZCSOT; they are only there to receive what the chief 
does for them, thus culminating into paternalism and dependency. This results in chiefs being 
seen as saviours of their communities, thus strengthening their power over their people. With 
regards to this, Bourdillon (1982) notes that for chiefs to be respected by their people, they 
were supposed to be able to fight for them and provide for their needs. To this end, the 
discovery of minerals and the promotion of community ownership by government policies 
have strengthened the power of traditional leaders over their people as observed by Negi 
(2000) in Zambia‘s copper belt and Manson (2013) in South Africa‘s platinum belt. The 
implication of this on community development is that it stifles community participation, 
compromises accountability, increases the risk of corruption and may see the chiefs being the 
beneficiaries of certain things meant for the communities. 
Chiefs are believed to be representatives of their communities and viewed as able to raise 
matters that concern their people at different levels (Bourdillon, 1982; Negi, 2000). However, 
some of the respondents in this study disagreed with this claim. A community member, when 
asked whether their chief is able to represent the interests of the people in the ZCSOT said;  
“You know what people are; where there is money, they start thinking of themselves, 
and when they start thinking of others, their pockets will be full. Like what happened 
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here, we heard that the chief took some of the money from the Trust and put it to 
personal use. It even came out of the papers, I’m not lying” (Interview: Joyce; 
02/09/2013).  
To confirm what Joyce said, corruption bells were raised in 2011 regarding the way the 
ZCSOT was administered and there were allegations that chiefs in Zvishavane awarded 
themselves US$5 000 each as sitting allowance for a meeting they had convened as chiefs to 
decide how to use a US$2 million donation of the ‗seed money‘ from Mimosa Platinum Mine 
(ChangeZimbabwe.com, August 13, 2012; Mawowa, 2013). This shows the need to have a 
critical insight in the rural social relations of power so that, as argued by Ledwith (2011), 
these power relations will not end up benefiting the already privileged members in society as 
has happened in this case. It questions the effectiveness of participation through 
representation, especially when the representatives of the people are not elected like chiefs. It 
shows that community development without popular participation can result in corrupt 
tendencies, thus compromising accountability.  
Paternalism does not only ruin the participation of the generality of people, rather it also 
destroys the objective of the indigenisation policy, which is to empower citizens through 
facilitating their active participation in the economy. Instead of empowering rural 
communities, the way the ZCSOT is operating further entrenches the dependency syndrome 
which the President of Zimbabwe said should be gotten rid of through the establishment of 
CSOTs. CSOTs were established to ensure the empowerment of indigenous Zimbabwean 
communities so that they are able to define their economic destiny through active 
participation, and contribute to their own and the country‘s economic growth. In the words of 
President Mugabe, ―genuine empowerment begins with making own decisions as opposed to 
being perpetual observers or by-standers and recipients of charity (NIEEB, 2013). Genuine 
empowerment of these communities can only be achieved through broad-based participation 
of community members in defining solutions to their problems. However, due to paternalism, 
the people in Zvishavane hardly associate the activities of the ZCSOT as part of their 
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entitlement under indigenisation laws and they do not take them as products of their efforts 
because they rarely take part in deciding what the Trust does. The response below by a 
community member shows a loss of empowerment and increased dependency;  
“We really thank the chief and the people from the Trust for what they are doing to us, 
we hope that they will continue doing this great work in our community” (Interview: 
Admire; 07/09/2013).  
From the above, it is evident that the people do not take any part in influencing what the 
ZCSOT does; it clearly shows how paternalistic the CSOT is. Instead of empowering the 
communities so that they take part in decision making and then identify themselves with the 
projects, it makes them see the activities of the Trust as charity. I think this form of ‗elite 
capture‘ is made worse by the vagueness of the indigenisation and economic empowerment 
policy. Though the policy stresses the need to promote broad-bases participation of 
indigenous Zimbabweans, it does not spell out how this can be achieved. What the policy 
does is to suggest some of the projects that can be carried out by CSOTs. It says the money 
accruing to a CSOT should be used for; ―the provision, operation and maintenance of schools 
and other educational… facilities connected therewith, clinics, the provision and maintenance 
of dipping tanks,… roads… and waterworks (IEE (General) Regulations, 2010:19). The 
policy does not give an operation framework to be followed in the execution of Trust 
activities. Critics argue that it is because the policy was rushed and poorly formulated 
because it was politically motivated (Robertson, 2012; Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012; Mawowa, 
2013), and this makes it difficult for the policy to pay economic dividends to the people of 
Zimbabwe.  
Again, paternalism tends to stifle democracy. The literature has shown that the chief is seen 
as a ‗father‘ who is responsible for providing for his people. This moral value makes it 
morally inappropriate to challenge the chief in matters related to the ZCSOT because he 
himself knows what is good for the people.  
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“You cannot challenge the chief when you are at the chief’s court; it’s impossible and 
inappropriate in our tradition. We have to respect him, we don’t question some of the 
things he tells us, he is the father to us, so we have to respect him. The chief himself 
knows why we were given these projects, so we can’t confront him, he knows what’s 
good for us” (Interview: James; 04/09/2013).  
This response shows that community members just accept without questioning what their 
chief brings from the Trust due to the traditional moral values which ascribe to the chief the 
role of a father to his people. This is in line with Mamdani (1996) who notes that the relations 
of kinship legitimise the power of traditional leaders and the people often see the person of 
the chief as signifying a form of power that is ―total and absolute, unchecked and 
unrestrained.‖ In terms of community development, such projects will be just imposed on the 
people and might always not result in them benefiting. Community development needs to be 
participatory and democratic in its character (Gaventa, and Valderrama, 1999; Gaventa, 2004; 
Mohan and Stokke, 2000) 
However the traditional leader said community members are free to express their disapproval 
if chiefs do something inappropriately. He says;  
“As a board member of the Zvishavane community trust we do what is relevant to the 
people, what they would have said they want through their village heads, that’s what 
we do for them. If they want a school, we give them a school otherwise they can express 
discontent if we give them something that is not relevant to their needs” (Interview: Mr 
Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
Though the chief‘s sentiments show that the people can demonstrate their disapproval if 
certain things are done the way they do not like, most of the community members remained 
adamant that from a moral perspective, it is not cultural, thus qualifying Mamdani‘s (1996) 
position that the people often see the person of the chief as signifying a form of power that is 
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―total and absolute, unchecked and unrestrained‖. This therefore shows how undemocratic 
the institution of traditional leaders is as contested by Rangan and Gilmartin (2002). 
The study shockingly revealed that, in the name of representing the people, the chiefs 
sometimes become the direct beneficiaries of certain material benefits of empowerment from 
the ZCSOT. This is in agreement with Negi (2011:229) who laments that some community 
development initiatives often regard chiefs ―not only as the means of reaching the 
community, but as its very embodiment.‖ Explaining how the ZCSOT is helping out the 
Zvishavane district on the issue of securing food security, one of the key informants said; 
“Also what we have done in line with food security is that given that this is a dry area 
we discovered that draught power itself in the recent years it has really dwindled.  You 
find out that many people lost their livestock due to the inconsistent rains we have been 
receiving lately. As such, even if the people get enough rains it will be difficult for the 
farmers to do any activity. So we came in as a Trust and we bought tractor disc 
ploughs and tractor tyres, you find out that most of our chiefs they were given tractors 
under the agrarian reform programme. So we discovered that since these are the 
people in authority we realised that it was best that we provide maintenance support so 
that they can even assist community members in providing tillage facilities so we can 
safely say at least we have tried to address the problem of draught power that was 
actually affecting the communities… And also to address the water challenges we have 
drilled a borehole at each chief’s homestead” (Interview: Mr Tsungai, 05/09/2013). 
Drawing from the above response, it can be noted that chiefs sometimes end up being the 
direct beneficiaries of the projects intended for the communities. The belief is that since they 
are the pinnacle of the pyramid of kinship (Crehan, 199), and as ‗fathers‘ to their subjects 
(Bourdillon, 1976), they can be the centre from which benefits of development can filter to 
the people they lead. Surprisingly, no member of the community interviewed acknowledged 
receiving any assistance from the chief‘s tractor for ploughing. This indicates that giving 
chiefs certain things with the view that they will give back to their communities is far from 
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reality. It also shows the deterioration of the traditional responsibilities of chiefs as fathers to 
their people. So rather than such initiatives benefiting the rural communities, they will benefit 
the chief only. 
Mamdani (1996) offers a critical analysis of the institution of traditional authority in rural 
communities. Analysing the role of traditional leaders since the colonial period, Mamdani 
says they were incorporated into the governance system as a form of ‗indirect rule‘ to the 
people by central governments. On a similar note, Rangan and Gilmartin (2002) assert that 
traditional leaders were co-opted by post-colonial governments to maintain indirect rule of 
the people, a system popularly described by Mamdani (1996) as decentralised despotism. 
Also, De Visser, Steytler and Machingauta (2010) argue that politicians always take 
advantage of the influence traditional leaders have on their people so that they can influence 
the electoral and governance processes. The study has also shown that the involvement of 
traditional leaders in the ZCSOT is susceptible to manipulation by politicians who want 
political popularity. The chief is said to have been popularising the ZCSOT at ZANU-PF 
rallies, clearly indicating their political allegiance to ZANU-PF. Therefore, as argued by 
Robertson (2012), the use of development initiatives such as the ZCSOT for political motives 
compromises its socio-economic objectives, thus making its transformative capacity very 
doubtful and questionable. 
In the final analysis, the active role assumed by chiefs in the ZCSOT in deliberating on the 
projects to be carried out has been seen in both positive and negative terms. Because chiefs 
are regarded as the traditional owners of the land, and the belief that life comes from the land, 
traditional leaders are thus seen as the custodians of the land. They are also seen as fathers to 
their people due to the kinship-based nature of chieftaincy. As custodians and fathers, chiefs 
are believed to be representing the interests of their people and raise matters that concern 
their people to the community trust. This also ensures them to promote development that 
directly addresses the needs of the people in their communities. Moreover, it makes them 
more accountable to their people, thus may reduce incidences of corruption. However, the 
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study also revealed that the institution of traditional authority, though at times vital, can 
promote paternalism, thus stifling community participation in deciding the projects to be 
undertaken by the trust. Again, the sanctification of the institution of traditional authority 
makes it difficult to challenge chiefs whenever the community sees something to be 
inappropriate, thus resulting despotism which makes the operation of the trust liable to 
corruption. Chiefs can also end up being the sole beneficiaries of some development 
initiatives meant for the community especially when they are seen as the embodiment of the 
community. Therefore, the role played by traditional leaders need to be critically analysed. 
Indigeneity, participation and empowerment: a reality or rhetoric? 
Mining indigenisation in Zimbabwe seeks to ensure that Zimbabwe‘s minerals are owned by 
and benefit ‗indigenous‘ Zimbabweans (Matyszak, 2010), thus affirming the discourse of 
indigeneity which is common in post-colonial narratives of empowerment in Africa (Cheater, 
1999). This leads to the question of who is the indigenous as well as the question of nativism. 
Based on this discourse of indigeneity, the IEE policy seeks to redress historical imbalances 
which saw indigenous Zimbabweans being ―disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the 
grounds‖ of their race during colonisation (IEE Act [Chapter 14:33]). To this end, CSOTs are 
established to guarantee local ‗indigenous‘ communities in resource-rich areas shareholding 
in all foreign-owned businesses operating in these communities. They are seen as vehicles 
through which the previously disadvantaged indigenous communities can participate directly 
in the economy of Zimbabwe and benefit from the country‘s natural resources (NIEEB, 
2013). Generally, the indigenisation policy seeks to ensure that indigenous or native 
Zimbabweans benefit from the exploitation of the country‘s mineral resources through 
partaking in the ownership and utilisation of such resources for their own empowerment. 
However, questions regarding the concept of indigeneity, the process of broad-based 
participation always surface in exploring how these communities benefit from CSOTs. 
Building on the discourse of indigeneity, one would expect that the nativeness of local 
communities would guarantee and strengthen their active participation in the CSOT as 
purported in the IEE policy. However, as will be shown in this analysis, the active 
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participation of local communities remains at the level of the rhetoric due to a number of 
factors such as politicisation and political manipulation by political elites.   
Representative participation 
CSOTs seek to transform the socio-economic conditions of people living in resource-rich 
areas through promoting ―broad-based participation‖ in resource ownership and in finding 
solutions to their problems (NIEEB, 2013). Also, the operational framework for the CSOS as 
outlined by the MYDIE (2012) states that a CSOT should have a wide representation in order 
to ensure transparency, fairness, justice and equitability in resource utilisation. However, the 
question of how this participation and wide representation can be ensured is vital, because it 
is through partaking in the ownership of mineral wealth and participation in decision making 
that the communities can directly benefit from natural resource extraction. The structural 
functionality of the ZCSOT is based on a Board of Trustees who, according to the NIEEB 
(2013), ―have a fiduciary duty towards the beneficiaries of the trust and must act in their 
interest when implementing the objectives of the Trust.‖ The Board of Trustees should 
comprise thirteen members who should act in the interest of the people, thus raising notions 
of participation through representation.       
Representative participation, like representative democracy, is based on the principles of 
representation of groups of people, mostly through elected representatives. Gaventa (2004) 
posits that representation is not an enemy to participation; rather in some cases it facilitates 
the participation of marginalised groups through their representatives. Gaventa opines that 
community representatives are able to ―make better decisions‖ that are in the interests of the 
communities they represent if they are unanimously chosen by the interest groups. Therefore, 
for this research, it is important to explore how the members of the Trust‘s board are selected 
as this is of significance in investigating whether or not they represent the interests of the 
people they purportedly represent in the Trust. To this end, I asked the community members 




Figure 5.2 Selection of trustees 
The indigenisation policy states that community share ownership trusts should be presided 
over by trustees who ―will hold the shares or interest in the qualifying business on behalf of 
the community‖ (IEE (General) Regulation, 2010:18). If shares are held by trustees on behalf 
of the communities in question, then it suffices to assume that the people in that community 
should at least be aware of how the trustees are selected since they hold the shares on behalf 
of these communities. This will promote accountability, which is an integral component of 
community development. However, Figure 5.2 above shows that the people in the rural 
communities do not know how the people who constitute the trust‘s board are selected.  
The above figure shows that 28.6% of the respondents in the survey said members of the 
Trust‘s board are appointed by the government, which, if that is the case, is a direct violation 
of the principles of representative participation in general because the people should elect 
their own representatives. Shockingly, 67.3% of the respondents said they do not know how 
the trustees are selected. Asked if they ever participated in the selection of the trustees, 98% 
said they never participated. 
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“They are the people who have been entrusted by the government with the shares from 
the mining companies. These trustees include the five chiefs in Zvishavane, then we 
also have the council CEO, we have the council chairperson, we have the District 
Administrator, we have a representative from Ministry of Youth, then we also have a 
legal advisor, a chartered accountant and a representative from the qualifying 
business. We are also supposed to have a representative for the youths, for the disabled 
and for women, so if the board is fully constituted, it’s supposed to have a total of 
sixteen members, but currently we have thirteen” (Interview: Mr Tsungai; 05/09/2013).  
This remark thus shows that ordinary community members do not play any role in selecting 
the people who constitute the Trust‘s board. Also, the IEE (General) Regulations (2010) does 
not talk of the election of board members, instead, it talks of their appointment: ―The Rural 
District Council shall have the right to appoint the trustee or trustees who will hold the shares 
or interest in the qualifying business on behalf of the community‖ (Section 14B (3)). The fact 
that there are no representatives for women, the youth and the disabled indicates how non-
representative the ZCSOT‘s board is, which has ripple effects on the ability of people to 
benefit from the CSOT.  
With regards to the communities‘ role in selecting the trustees, the traditional leader said;  
“The DA is not elected, there is one District Administrator in the district, there is one 
chairperson of the Local Authority, there is one head of department for youth, so 
obviously these people are not elected, they automatically come into the Board 
representing their different ministries and departments. Then there are chiefs who are 
again not elected” (Interview: Mr Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
As vehicles of participation and to promote accountability, CSOTs should foster the 
participation of people in choosing the people who represent them in the Trust. In essence, 
the lack of participation by community members in selecting trustees who represent them in 
the CSOT defeats the main goal of empowerment as it excludes the communities who should 
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benefit through direct participation. Representative participation, which Gaventa and 
Valderrama (1999) also refer to as indirect participation, allows the indigenous people to 
participate through elected representatives. In his study of the Mhondoro-Ngezi Community 
Share Ownership Trust, Mawowa (2013) shows the displeasure of community members in 
the lack of representation in the CSOT. Representative participation, as argued by Gaventa 
and Valderrama, is mainly concerned with influencing decisions taken by representatives of 
the people. Actually, indirect participation enables ordinary community members to hold the 
people they elected more accountable. It therefore means that if the government is the one 
that selects the trustees, then the principles of indirect participation are compromised, thereby 
compromising accountability, which affects the ability of the CSOT to implement projects 
that would be meeting the needs of the intended beneficiaries. 
Participation of community members in the ZCSOT  
The fact that community members do not have any elected representative in the ZCSOT‘s 
board forced me want to explore the ways in which ordinary community members participate 
in the ZCSOT as envisaged in the indigenisation policy. Participation is the backbone of the 
process of community development. It involves ―organised efforts to increase control over 
resources and regulative institutions by groups hitherto excluded from such control‖ (Stiefel 
and Wolfe (1994:5) in Gaventa and Valderrama (1999). Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) 
went on to say it is a process through which marginalised groups of people influence and 
share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them. 
In this sense, participation is located amongst those who had been excluded from existing 
institutions, which means they should participate in all phases of development, from needs 
assessment, to appraisal, to implementation, to monitoring and evaluation.  
Effective community participation should start within the social settings of the people that 
need to be empowered. This study has shown that before the implementation of projects by 
the ZCSOT, a needs assessment was conducted;  
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―We conducted needs assessment around the district at ward centres. People were 
asked to come up with projects they think would address the problems they are facing‖ 
(Interview: Mr Tsungai; 05/09/2013).  
The traditional leader also concurred that the ZCSOT did a pre-implementation needs 
assessment;  
“We did an outreach campaign throughout the whole district. We subdivided the board 
members and moved around the district with some people from the Ministry of Youth, 
the province and even people from NIEEB. People were asked during these meetings 
what they want the Trust to do and they suggested their own projects” (Interview: Mr 
Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
From the above responses, it can be noted that the rural communities were consulted on the 
projects they wanted the Trust to do for them. A needs assessment was done by the ZCSOT 
as a way of incorporating the beneficiary communities‘ opinions in the projects to be 
undertaken. Also, data from the survey confirms that the ZCSOT convened/convenes 
meetings with community members as shown in Figure 5.3. 
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From Figure 5.3 above, about 73.5% of the respondents agreed that the ZCSOT hold 
community meetings with the people in the rural communities. This is despite 24.5% 
professing ignorance on meetings held at community level by the ZCSOT. The reason for this 
might be that, since most of the meetings held for the Trust were superimposed on ZANU-PF 
political rallies as revealed earlier, it might be that those who did not attend the political 
rallies would not know about the meetings held by the ZCSOT as no such meetings were 
held, as shown in this study, exclusively for the ZCSOT. Nevertheless, the fact still remains 
that the ZCSOT held consultative meetings with the communities in Zvishavane. It is also 
important to explore whether the people were motivated to attend such meetings as shown in 
Figure 5.4 below. 
 
Figure 5.4: Participation in community meetings 
From the Figure above, 59.2% of the respondents acknowledged that they participate even 
though only 18.4% of these respondents said they actively participate in these meetings with 
the remaining 40.8% saying they participate not constantly and not actively. Also, 40.8% of 
the respondents said they do not participate at all in these meetings. At face value, credit will 
be given for the participation engendered by the Trust at community level despite a rigid 
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the CSOT as trustees. Nevertheless, the presence of some community members who do not 
feel motivated to participate actively in these meetings is still worrying. It invokes the 
question: Why do some community members not participate in such community meetings 
when the ZCSOT was instituted to stimulate the participation of rural communities in 
economic issues? Most probably, the answer lies in the politicised nature of CSOTs in 
Zimbabwe. As already discussed, CSOTs were highly politicised, so this might give little 
motivation for people to participate in the meetings at community level. To this end, the 
politicisation of the ZCSOT resulted in the [self]-exclusion of other community members to 
participate. 
Consultation is one important aspect of participation which, as argued by Gaventa and 
Valderrama (1999), enables marginalised people to influence and share in development 
initiatives. In the process, it opens up chances for the implementation of context specific 
development initiatives. Pre-implementation consultative meetings are vital in community 
development because they allow intended beneficiaries who are keenly aware of their needs 
and have their own priorities (Uphoff (1985). More importantly, if these voices from below 
are heed by authorities responsible for the implementation of projects, in this case the 
ZCSOT, this form of consultative participation can be a means of strengthening the 
relevance, quality and sustainability of the development projects mooted through such 
process (Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999). In the end, it is important to look at how do the 
community members view such consultative processes; do they feel empowered to influence 
and share in control of the projects implemented by the ZCSOT, how often are they 
consulted? 
It is important to note that the holding of consultative meetings is one thing, and what comes 
out of such meetings is another. Consulting communities about their needs is significant in 
the process of community development only if the people‘s ideas are incorporated in the 
whole process of development. The incorporation of beneficiary communities‘ views is 
important in instilling a sense of ownership of the outcomes of development, thus promoting 
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the sustainability. However, during the interviews, a community member refuted that the 
consultation done by the ZCSOT realised any significant contributions from the local 
communities on the projects to be implemented by the ZCSOT. She said the consultative 
meetings that were carried out were not successful in tapping the communities‘ suggestions;  
“I cannot say we played a significant role because when these meetings were done we 
were not even sure about what we were doing since this was done at the same time with 
ZANU-PF rallies. We were just doing it because we were asked to do it; we were not 
even expecting anything…I think the chief, maybe with some  headmen, are the are the 
ones who knew where this was leading us to” (Interview: Rudo; 02/09/2013).  
Another respondent said;  
“We were at a ZANU-PF rally and they said women and the youth will be given loans 
to do projects of their choice. They also asked the whole community what we wanted to 
be done by the Trust. You know these people were campaigning, so we just thought that 
that they were lying to us. We didn’t think that they will deliver. Actually we were 
shocked to see these projects. But I think it was going to be more successful if they had 
separated the Trust’s business with politics. People were not taking them seriously, we 
were just saying it’s politics (Interview: Tawanda; 09/09/2013). 
As noted by White (1996), participation in community development is always political 
especially concerning how the people participate and on whose terms. Cooke and Kothari 
(2007) contend that participatory techniques in the process of community development have 
been sanctified to such an extent that the imperfections of participation are overshadowed and 
overlooked. To this end, they critiqued participatory community development as, if not 
properly managed, having tyrannical tendencies as it can embody ―the potential for an 
unjustified exercise of power‖ (Cooke and Kothari, 2007:4). On this, White (1996) lament 
that people may be flattered by attending community meetings as this point some element of 
recognition and incorporation in the process of development. Burkey (1993) also argues that 
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participation should not concentrate on holding community meetings with the poor in order to 
tell them of predetermined plans. But this is exactly what the ZCSOT is doing and this is an 
abuse of the discourse of participation. More disturbingly, rather than the meetings being held 
exclusively for the ZCSOT, they were submerged with political rallies and this is an 
indication of political ‗elite capture‘.   
As said before, the politicisation of the ZCSOT resulted in disillusionment among community 
members and it inhibited the realisation of the goal of empowerment. When they participated 
in these meetings, the intended beneficiaries did not feel empowered to be ‗masters of their 
destiny‘ because their participation was tokenistic, a mere symbolic gesture of community 
engagement but the communities do not have any significant power to effect change. This 
reduces participation to a ‗buzzword‘ prominent in marketing the discourse of participatory 
development but with no meaningful participation experienced by the people (Minderhoud, 
2009). Lack of meaningful participation by community members defeats the objectives of the 
indigenisation process, to promote community ownership and empowerment through 
participation.  
As highlighted by Burkey (1993), participation should not only be about attending 
community meetings, rather, the people should make their contributions and these need to be 
considered in problem identification and problem solving. Again, when participants‘ views 
are taken into consideration, it is highly likely that development initiatives conceived out of 
such processes will be context specific, addressing the needs of the affected communities. 
Community participation allows the communities to own the outcomes of their creative 
energies, hence promoting sustainability. However, the results from the survey show that 
respondents do not feel to be included in the processes of development pioneered by the 
ZCSOT. Figure 5.5 below summarises the results concerning ordinary community members‘ 




Figure 5.5: Consideration of community members‘ views during community meetings 
From the survey data in Figure 5.5 above, 51% of the respondents acknowledged that the 
views of ordinary community members are taken into consideration during community 
meetings, thus implying that the community plays a part in influencing the activities of the 
Trust. However, this remains to be seen considering the exclusion of the rural communities 
from choosing or selecting the Trust‘s board members. The absence of elected representatives 
of the people in the Trust‘s board, where most of the crucial planning is done, makes it less 
likely for the views of community members to be put into consideration in the 
implementation of the projects. The traditional leader said; 
“There is a committee responsible for projects, and this committee does the selection 
and prioritisation in relation to what the people have suggested” (Interview: Mr 
Mutongi; 04/09/2013).  
However, the absence of elected representatives of the communities in the committee makes 
it possible that the committee will prioritise the projects which they see as important to 
themselves, resulting in what is referred to as elite driven development (White, 1996; 
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problematic as it is the elite who end up influencing the outcomes of participation; in this 
case the prioritisation of projects by the ZCSOT is the case on point. In essence, decision 
making in the ZCSOT with regards to the projects undertaken by the Trust does not engender 
broad-based community participation. This qualifies Arnstein‘s (1969) assertion that 
participation without power is an empty ritual and frustrating process for the powerless 
because they do not have any power to effect change in circumstances affecting them. 
About 44.9% of the respondents were sceptical about their views being considered in 
effecting the activities of the CSOT. This is in line with Minderhoud‘s (2009) realisation that 
participation may take place at a symbolic level while actual decisions are made at a higher 
level, as shown in the traditional leader‘s remarks above when he said there is a committee 
responsible for prioritisation of projects. Incorporating the views of ordinary community 
members is vital for community development, and it also promotes the empowerment of 
indigenous communities, which is the main objective of CSOTs. Therefore, absence of 
community participation means no empowerment at all for those communities. 
For effective community development, consultation needs to be an on-going process, not a 
once off event. However, the study revealed that besides the needs assessment that was 
conducted, no other community-wide meetings were held by the ZCSOT. On this on this, 
Tawanda said;  
“The only meeting that was conducted by the Trust that I know of is the one which was 
held at the ward centre when we were asked to name the projects that we want the 
Trust to do for us. Since then, I haven’t heard of any meeting” (Interview: Tawanda; 
09/09/2013). 
The above sentiments are in line with Uphoff (1985) who laments that sometimes the 
meetings held are only transitory and short-lived. This will result in community development 
being elite-driven since people are not consulted frequently. Therefore, the inability of the 
ZCSOT to promote broad-based participation questions its commitment to empowering 
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indigenous Zimbabweans through participation, something that raises the question around the 
concept of indigeneity; who are the indigenous people? This is because the ZCSOT is failing 
to guarantee the broad-based participation of ordinary community members in resource-rich 
communities as envisaged in the indigenisation policy. Does that mean that they are less 
‗indigenous Zimbabweans‘ whose contributions do not matter in the process of broad-based 
empowerment? 
Indigenisation changing people’s lives: Are the communities benefiting? 
CSOTs that have been instituted in most parts of Zimbabwe‘s mineral rich rural areas are 
meant to transform the living conditions of those rural communities, to pool them out of ‗the 
resource curse,‘ a prominent characteristic of many resource rich communities as noted by 
Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007). While all the respondents in the survey acknowledged 
that there are projects done by the ZCSOT in their communities which include building 
schools, drilling boreholes and rehabilitating rural health centres, the question that need to be 
explored is: Is the ZCSOT transforming the socio-economic conditions of people in 
Zvishavane?  
 















Transformation of living standards








Figure 5.6 above shows that 73.5% of the respondents acknowledge that the ZCSOT is 
transforming the social and economic standards in the rural communities of Zvishavane. This 
means that the communities are able to derive benefits from the projects being implemented 
by the CSOT. This is notwithstanding the fact that the ZCSOT does not engender the active 
participation of the rural communities in coming up with the projects meant for these 
communities. Does this mean that the end matters more than the means used to reach the 
end? Can the end results justify the means used no matter how inappropriate the means is? By 
no means! If inappropriate means are used to achieve good ends, this might stir discontent 
among the beneficiaries, despite the fact that the end results are positive. To this effect, 
26.5% of the respondents disagreed that the ZCSOT has transformed their lives. If the CSOT 
is meant to empower the communities and they do not feel empowered, then that means it is 
still far from transforming these rural communities. If the rural communities continue to feel 
excluded from the Trust activities and continue to be reduced to recipients of these projects 
without their active involvement, this will impede the full realisation of the empowerment of 
these communities; which is the goal of the indigenisation policy.  
Effective community development needs complete involvement of the communities in the 
whole process of development. The communities still need to feel empowered, to be part of 
the struggle to solve the challenges they are facing. This is integral for the sustainability of 
the programme. Failure to be part of the development makes communities to be disillusioned 
and continue seeing the Trust as a ZANU-PF machine for political subjectification as shown 
by one respondent;  
“I think it was a strategy by ZANU-PF to win our votes, now it is its strategy to make 
us loyal to it and the chiefs, seeing ZANU-PF as the saviour of our community, yet we 
are not taking part in the so called empowerment process” (Interview: Tawanda; 
09/09/2013).  
However, despite these concerns, we should appreciate what the Trust is doing in 
Zvishavane. It is trying to mitigate some of the problems bedevilling Zvishavane‘s rural 
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communities. These were the challenges the government and mining companies operating in 
Zvishavane were failing to address for a long time. The ZCSOT has managed to build a 
number of classroom blocks in various schools across Zvishavane District. This is meant to 
improve the education delivery system in Zvishavane by creating an environment conducive 
for the learning of children. A number of rural clinics have been rehabilitated through 
building new structures especially staff houses and the Trust has electrified another clinic. It 
has come in handy in easing the water woes that have ravaged the district by drilling a 
number of boreholes. These are the projects that the CSOT has done in Zvishavane, and 
failing to appreciate their transformative capacity will be unfair.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has given an analysis of the operation of the ZCSOT with the aim of 
ascertaining the practicality of ‗community‘ ownership of mineral resource wealth, as well as 
‗community‘ participation and empowerment as is the vision of mining indigenisation. The 
indigenisation policy and CSOTs in Zimbabwe are meant to promote the participation of 
‗indigenous‘ Zimbabweans in the economic development of the country. However, what 
came out of this study is contrary to the objectives of the IEE policy in as far as broad-based 
participation of ordinary community members is concerned. The ZCSOT has failed to 
guarantee the participation of ordinary community members in its activities, which is the 
prerogative of local communities in resource-rich areas as outlined in the indigenisation 
policy documents. I found that the reason for the failure of effective community participation 
is due to the politicisation of the ZCSOT as well as manipulation by political and local elites. 
The politicisation of the Trust prevented the effective dissemination of the empowerment 
agenda as shown by some of the respondents from this study that the association of the Trust 
with politics gave them little motivation to participate in some community meetings held by 
the Trust. This created an information gap where some ordinary community members were 
not aware of their role in the ZCSOT. Added to this was the manipulation especially by 
traditional leaders. The involvement of traditional leaders has resulted in the creation of 
paternalistic relations of domination which are against the principles of participatory 
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development. These operational imperfections are an impediment to the full realisation of the 
goals of economic empowerment. Nevertheless, despite these imperfections, the study 
revealed that the ZCSOT is doing a commendable role in enhancing the social and economic 



























CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
This study focused on exploring the contribution of Zimbabwe‘s indigenisation policy to 
community development with particular reference to the ZCSOT. CSOTs were established in 
Zimbabwe‘s resource-rich areas to enhance the participation of local communities in resource 
ownership and to enable them to participate in finding solutions to their own problems, and 
this is how local communities can be empowered. Since community development hinges on 
citizen participation, the study aimed to investigate the ways in which ordinary community 
members in Zvishavane participate in the activities of the CSOT and how they derive benefits 
from such participation. This chapter will present a summary of the findings as well as 
conclusions made therefrom.  
Summary of findings 
The presence of mineral resources as well as the existence of mining activities brings the 
hope for opportunities and prospects for better living conditions. Mineral resource extraction, 
as an economic activity, is capable of stimulating the social and economic transformation of 
areas around which resources are being extracted. Extractive industries are able to achieve 
this through the practices of CSR. However, many resource-rich areas around the world are 
known for their social and economic misery despite the existence of mining activities. The 
failure of resource-rich communities to benefit from the extraction of mineral resources 
plunges them into what is referred to as the resource curse and this shows the weaknesses of 
liberalised market-oriented development. Zvishavane district was one such area that was 
languishing in the resource curse prior to the promulgation if the IEE policy.  
The study used a micro-level approach to investigate the contribution of community 
ownership of mineral resource wealth to community development. Community development 
has been conceptualised to refer to a series of processes aimed at transforming the social and 
economic wellbeing of the whole community with the participation and on the initiative of 
community members. The study focused on the ZCSOT which was established after the 
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implementation of the indigenisation policy in Zimbabwe. Using a between-method data 
collection approach, data were collected using a questionnaire and in-depth interviews. The 
time I spent in the field was significant as this enabled me to make certain observations, 
especially on the work being done by the ZCSOT in Zvishavane‘s rural communities. These 
findings, though specific to a single CSOT, can be extended to other CSOTs in Zimbabwe as 
well as other community development initiatives that seek to empower local communities 
through promoting their participation in controlling and utilising natural resources. 
The study examined the social and economic status of Zvishavane district, exploring the 
challenges that the people were facing and are still facing and the ways in which this resource 
curse can be reversed through mining indigenisation. Despite Zvishavane being a mineral 
endowed district, the people from the resource-rich communities were experiencing extreme 
conditions of social and economic deprivation, and a parliamentary report has declared the 
district a high poverty area. Most of the challenges that were experienced in Zvishavane 
before the establishment of the ZCSOT, and some which the people experience even today 
fall within the commitments of CSR. Some of these challenges include poor infrastructure in 
schools and rural health centres which affect service delivery, acute water shortages, and 
unemployment and low levels of household income. Other challenges are a result of the 
expansion of mining activities, for example the loss of agricultural land due to mining 
encroachment. Of importance is that the ZCSOT has stepped up efforts to respond to some of 
the challenges the people of Zvishavane were facing. 
The study found out that the mining companies in Zvishavane have done very little to 
mitigate these challenges. This shows that mining companies, because of their preoccupation 
with profiteering, hardly commit themselves to the acceptable practices of CSR. Again, the 
study revealed that where mining companies are involved in CSR activities, such activities 
may not be of significant benefit to the people who are directly affected by the mining 
activities. In fact, such activities are in themselves misplaced priorities. An illustration here is 
the sponsoring of a football club by Mimosa Mining Company and this club does not benefit 
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the rural communities at all. This qualifies the arguments raised by some authors who critique 
CSR labelling it as an image management tool by mining companies that does not adequately 
address the challenges being faced by people residing in areas from which they do their 
businesses.  
The failure of indigenous Zimbabweans to benefit from natural resource extraction has 
inspired the implementation of the IEE policy. The policy realises that foreign capital is 
benefiting more from the country‘s resources while the rightful owners of the resources are 
languishing in poverty. As such, the policy seeks to enhance the wellbeing of indigenous 
Zimbabweans by facilitating their participation in the economic activities of the country. The 
policy calls for the establishment of CSOTs in resource-endowed areas, as vehicles through 
which local communities can be empowered to participate in the ownership and utilisation of 
natural resources. The study has shown that government‘s intervention through the IEE 
policy and the resultant establishment of CSOTs has brought considerable social and 
economic value in resource-rich communities. In this case, the Zvishavane communities are 
benefiting from the numerous projects undertaken by the ZCSOT, thus highlighting the 
significance of the indigenisation policy in pulling them out of the resource curse. Through 
the ZCSOT, Zvishavane communities have seen the health and education delivery systems 
improving through the building of various infrastructures at schools and clinics. Also, the 
Trust has worked towards improving water supply for domestic uses, and in the process 
offering short-term employment to locals.   
The study was based on the principles of community development, which refers to a series of 
processes that give local communities greater control over social and economic conditions 
affecting their lives. Hence, it was imperative to investigate the processes of interaction 
between the ZCSOT and the local communities in order to examine the practicality of 
‗community‘ ownership, participation and empowerment as envisaged by the IEE policy.  
The research findings reveal that despite the ZCSOT being instrumental in reversing the 
resource curse in Zvishavane, the CSOT does not engender the full participation of local 
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communities which therefore militates against the principles of community development and 
the goals of indigenisation. The study found that there are a number of factors that impede the 
participation of local communities in the activities of the ZCSOT. These include lack of 
adequate knowledge about the ZCSOT due to politicisation as well as political manipulation 
of the CSOT which has resulted in excessive and often unwarranted involvement of 
traditional leaders. The politicisation of the ZCSOT has created disillusionment among some 
community members and this has demotivated them to attend community meetings organised 
by the Trust because they turn out to be political meetings for ZANU-PF. As such, the people 
were unable to get adequate information on what the ZCSOT is all about, its objectives as 
well as the role community members should play since it is their prerogative to participate as 
guaranteed in the IEE policy papers. The involvement of chiefs, though it is justified on the 
basis of their traditional role as custodians of the people, was shown to be an obstacle to the 
full participation of community members. In some instances, the chiefs would end up being 
the beneficiaries of things meant for community members. I also found out that the absence 
of an elected representative of community members in the Trust‘s board compromises their 
participation.  
The operation of the ZCSOT has exhibited high levels of paternalism due to its failure to 
foster the participation of ordinary community members. It also entrenches relations of 
domination especially between traditional leaders and their subjects. The involvement of 
traditional leaders in CSOTs has been criticised by political analysts as a strategy by ZANU-
PF to maintain indirect rule over people in resource-rich areas.  
Theoretical and policy implications of the study 
From the research findings, it can be deduced that participation of local communities and 
their subsequent empowerment through such participation is vital in ensuring benefit sharing 
in natural resource extraction. In theory, participation is important when it aims to secure the 
citizenship rights and involvement of marginalised groups in the community. Moreover, 
participation enhances development that is context-specific, sustainable and empowering to 
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the beneficiary communities. Participation assumes the redistribution of power in the process 
of decision making. Non-participation of ordinary community members defeats the goal of 
empowerment and will exclude them from owning the end products of development, thus 
affecting the sustainability of the projects. However, the question of how this can be achieved 
is vital.  
The operational imperfections inherent in ZCSOT indicate the challenges that can be 
encountered at the level of policy implementation. There is need to take cognisance of the 
fractured nature of rural communities, something that has a bearing on the full participation 
of ordinary community members. Failure to acknowledge the fact that rural communities are 
riddled by power dynamics makes CSOTs susceptible to manipulation by the powerful elites 
such as, in this case, traditional leaders and politicians. In order to avoid manipulation by 
elites, the policy needs to clearly state the role ordinary community members play in the 
CSOT. Communities need to be included at the discussion table, and this can be through 
elected representatives who are more accountable to the people.  
All in all, promotion of community participation in resource ownership is vital for 
community development. It enhances the participation of rural communities in the social and 
economic development of themselves and the country at large. However, such participation 
should not end in policy papers only; there is also need to establish institutional structures at 
community level that nurture the creative energies of all community members so that they 
can all participate. Failure to do so results in the manipulation of the process of community 
development by elites and subsequently the exclusion of ordinary community members. 
The theoretical and policy implications of this study should be useful in informing future 
research on the community ownership of mineral resource wealth and its contribution to 
community development. Future studies need to find out ways of harmonising the policy 
implications of the IEE policy with the socio-political realities of in the social organisation of 
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Appendix 2: Participant information sheet 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Topic of study: The role of the indigenisation policy in community development: A case study of the 
Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Scheme, Zvishavane district (Zimbabwe). 
My name is Johannes Machinya. I am a Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand. I would like to 
invite you to participate in my research project in which I will interview you on the contribution of the 
Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust to community development.  You should only participate if you 
want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to 
take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will 
involve.  Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  
You are free to ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Research Aims 
I am interested in exploring how the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust is contributing to 
community development in the Zvishavane community. I am specifically interested in the participation of 
community members in decisions about how the trust funds should be used, which projects to implement and 
how much should be spend on those projects. I am also interested in establishing how the community benefits 
from the projects implemented under the community share scheme.  
When and Where Will the Study Take Place? 
The interviews will take place in your home or any other place that suits you and at a time that is convenient to 
you. The interview will last approximately for forty to fifty minutes.  
What Will You Be Asked to Do? 
If you read and understand the information on this sheet, you will be asked to sign a consent form which shows 
that you have agreed to take part in the interviews. If you are not comfortable completing the form, you can just 
agree verbally before the interview starts. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason 
How Will I Maintain Your Privacy and Confidentiality? 
Everything we discuss in the interview will be confidential. If you are comfortable, I will give you an 
identification number to replace any information that identifies your name, your location or any other contact 
details for you. The information you are going to give during the interview will not be directly linked to you as 
only numerical IDs will be used.  
What If You Have Questions about the Project? 
You are free to contact me by e-mail at machinyaj@yahoo.com or you can contact my supervisor Dr Mosoetsa 
at the University of the Witwatersrand by email at sarah.mosoetsa@wits.ac.za or by post at University of the 
Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Sociology, 1 Jan Smuts Avenue Braamfontein, 
Johannesburg, South Africa (Postal code, 2000). 
128 
 
Appendix 3: Consent form for in-depth interviews 
CSOS-CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS 
I volunteer to be interviewed as part of the research project conducted by Johannes 
Machinya, a student at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. I 
understand that the project is designed to gather information about the contribution of the 
Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust to community development.  
I understand that: 
1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for 
my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.  
2. If I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to 
decline to answer any question or to end the interview. 
3. The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes. Notes will be written during the 
interview, and upon my consent, the interview may be tape recorded.  
4.  I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using 
information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this 
study will remain secure.  
7.  I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my 
questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.  
8.  I have been given a copy of this consent form.  
 ____________________________    ________________________  









Appendix 4: Interviews  
















Mr Mutongi 04/09/2013 
Mr Tsungai  04/09/2013 
Mrs Chepiri 05/09/2013 











Appendix 5: Interview schedule 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
Research question: The contribution of the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership 
Trust to community development. 
1. Please, can you provide a brief history of the Zvishavane Community Share 
Ownership Scheme? 
 
2. What are the main objectives of the Trust? 
 
3. Who are the main role players in the Trust? 
 How then are the people involved? 
 How do ordinary community members participate in the Trust? 
 
4. Which projects are implemented under the Trust? 
 How do you benefit? 
 
5. Who do you think have the greatest influence in the Trust? 
 How do they influence the operation of the Trust? 
 
6. Have there been any challenges with the projects and how were they resolved? 
 










Appendix 6: Questionnaire 
WITS UNIVERSITY 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF CSOSs TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
 
Date of interview: …………………………………………………………………………………... 
Location of interview: ………………………………………………………………………………  
Interviewer: …………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
1. Age:    
1 18-29 2 30-59   3 60 and above 
  
2. Sex:   
1 Male 2 Female 
      
3. Total number of people in the household (agree on the definition of household)? 
 
  
4. How long have you been living in Zvishavane District? 
…………………………………………… 
5. What is the primary source of your household income? 
1 Formal employment 
 Civil servant 
 NGO 
 Other  
2 Informal activities 
 Gold panning 
 Farming  
 Fishing  
 Other  
  
6. Do you earn enough to meet your basic household needs? 
1 Yes  
2 Sometimes  
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3 Not at all 
 





8.  If yes, how did you come to know of the scheme? 
1 Through community mobilisation and awareness 
2 Heard about it from others 
3 Through direct participation 
4 Other  
 
9. Which people constitute the core members of the Community Share Trust? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
10. How are these people selected? 
1 Appointed by government 
2 Elected by the community 
3 Don‘t know 
4 Other  
 
11. Have you ever participated in the selection of the people who constitute the 
community trust? 
1 Yes  
2 Not at all 
 
12. Are there meetings that are held concerning the Community Share Ownership 
Scheme? 
1 Yes  
2 No 
3 Don‘t know 
 
13. If yes, how often are these meetings convened? 
1 Regularly  
2 Not regularly 





14. Have you ever participated in any of those meetings? 
1 I actively participate 
2 I sometimes participate 
3 I do not participate at all 
 
15. Do you think the views of ordinary communities are taken into consideration when 
they participate in community meetings?  
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Don‘t know 
4 Disagree   
5 Strongly disagree  
 
16. Do you think the participation of ordinary community members in these meetings can 
contribute to improving the living conditions of the community?  
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree  
3 Don‘t know 
4 Disagree   
5 Strongly disagree 
 




18. Are there funds injected into the Community Share Trust?  
1 Yes  
2 No  
3 Don‘t know 
 
19. Do community members participate in deciding how the funds should be used? 
1 Always  
2 Sometimes 
3 Not at all 
4 Don‘t know  
 





21. If no, who decides how the funds should be used and how? (Explain your answer). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
22. Does every member of your community equally participate in making decisions 
concerning the projects to be implemented under the Community Share Trust? 
1 Always  
2 Sometimes  
3 Not at all 
4 Unsure  
 
23. Do you think community participation in decision making is important? Explain why. 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
24.  Are there people in your community who have more influence on deciding what 
should be done under the Community Share Trust? 
1 Yes 
2 No 
3 Unsure  
 
25. If yes who are these people? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
26.  In what ways do they influence? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 




4 Unsure  
 
28. Do you think that the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Trust is owned by the 
Zvishavane community? 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree  
3 Disagree  
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4 Strongly disagree  
5 Unsure  
 
29.  In your community, are there any projects implemented under the Zvishavane 




30. If yes, which projects are these?  
1 Building/rehabilitating schools 
2 Building/rehabilitating health centres 
3 Dam construction/borehole drilling 
4 Building/rehabilitating dip tanks 
5 Road construction 
6 Other  
 
31. Do you benefit from any of these projects? 
1 Always 
2 Sometimes  
3 Not at all 
 
32. If you benefit, explain how. 
..........................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................... 
33. If you do not benefit, who benefits? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
34. Is there anything done by the CSOS specifically to help vulnerable members of the 
society, e.g. the elderly, the young and the disabled?     
1 Yes  
2 No  
3 Unsure  
 
35. If yes, how are they helped? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
36. Has the establishment of the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Scheme 
transformed the living conditions of your community?  
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1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree  
3 Disagree  
4 Strongly disagree  
5 Unsure  
 
37. Since the establishment of the Zvishavane Community Share Trust, has any of the 
following services improved, remained the same or deteriorated for the people of 
Zvishavane? [Tick the appropriate answer] 
 Service Improved Not improved 
1 Education   
2 Health    
3 Clean water    
4 Sanitation    
5 Provision of food   
6 Road networks   
 
 
